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INTRODUCTION 
In this Occasional Paper the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs publishes its 
overview and assessments of the 2009 Pre-accession Economic Programmes of the candidate 
countries (Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey).   
One of the economic priorities of the 1999 and 2000 Accession Partnerships was the establishment of 
an annual fiscal surveillance for the candidate countries.  This gave birth to the so-called Pre-
Accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure, which aims at preparing countries for the participation in the 
multilateral surveillance and economic policy co-ordination procedures currently in place in the EU as 
part of the Economic and Monetary Union.  The Pre-Accession Economic Programmes (PEPs) are 
part of this procedure. 
The PEPs have two objectives.  First, to outline the medium-term policy framework, including public 
finance objectives and structural reform priorities needed for EU accession. Second, they offer an 
opportunity to develop the institutional and analytical capacity necessary to participate in EMU with 
derogation from the adoption of the euro upon accession, particularly in the areas of multilateral 
surveillance and co-ordination of economic policies.  The development of the institutional capacity to 
co-ordinate between the various ministries, government agencies and the central bank is a particularly 
important aspect ensuring the success of the Pre-Accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure. 
The three countries have published their 2009 programmes, which can be found on the web under 
following addresses: 
Croatia http://www.mfin.hr/adminmax/docs/2008_PEP%20eng.pdf  
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
http://www.finance.gov.mk/files/u9/PEP_Macedonia_2009-2011.pdf   
Turkey http://www.dpt.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebIcerikGoster
im.aspx?IcerikRef=4022&WorkArea=ctl38   
 
These assessments were prepared in the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 
under the guidance and coordination of Christophe Pavret de la Rochefordière.  The principal authors 
were Uwe Stamm (Croatia), Bernhard Böhm (the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and Dirk 
Verbeken (Turkey).   
The programmes and this assessment were discussed at experts' level in two multilateral meetings 
held in Brussels on 15 and 20 April 2009 and at ministerial level during the ECOFIN Council on 5 
May. Representatives from EU Member States, the ECB, the Commission and the candidate countries 
attended this meeting. 
Comments would be gratefully received and should be sent to: 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
Economies of candidate and potential candidate countries 
 
Carole Garnier  
European Commission  
B-1049 Brussels  
or by e-mail to Carole.Garnier@ec.europa.eu  
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1.1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey were invited to submit by 
31 January 2009 their annual Pre-accession Economic Programmes (PEPs) covering the period 2009-
2011.  The preparation, assessment and discussion of these programmes serve to strengthen economic 
planning capacity in the countries as such and to prepare them for their eventual participation in the 
economic policy co-ordination and budgetary surveillance mechanisms of Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU).  In the present crisis context, such programmes appear even more important as the 
crisis unfolding calls for a fresh re-assessment of each country's policy mix. 
Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia submitted their programme end of January, 
while Turkey was at that time still in discussions with the IMF, and requested a delay in order to align 
the programme assumptions with the outcome of the negotiations. While it did not conclude these 
discussions with the IMF, Turkey submitted its programme in early April. The submitted programmes 
contain overviews of economic policy plans over a broad range of issues until 2011.  In particular they 
show the governments' intentions to advance structural reforms, productivity gains and alignment with 
the EU acquis and EU best practices that will allow sufficiently high growth in order to catch up with, 
and prepare for membership in, the European Union.  However, the degree of ambition and precision 
in policy implementation across the programmes is not uniform.   
This exercise of submitting, assessing and discussing annual PEPs will continue to support the 
countries in their preparation for accession.  The EU provides an important anchor in this effort.  A 
further integration of pre-accession economic and fiscal surveillance with other instruments of pre-
accession economic policy formulation, in particular the economic chapters of the Progress Reports 
and Accession Partnerships and the bilateral economic dialogues with the countries, can increase the 
EU's effectiveness in this respect.  Technical assistance to candidate countries in the area of economic 
policy planning and implementation has proven powerful and should be continued. 
1.2. BACKGROUND 
The ECOFIN Council of 26/27 November 2000 requested the Commission to invite candidate 
countries to submit an annual PEP and an annual fiscal notification.  This initiative resulted in the so-
called Pre-Accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure, which aims at preparing countries for the 
participation in the multilateral surveillance and economic policy co-ordination procedures currently 
in place in the EU as part of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  The PEPs are part of this 
procedure.  Since 2001, acceding and candidate countries have submitted such annual medium-term 
PEPs, comprising a macro-economic scenario, a fiscal framework, a structural reform agenda and 
supplementary information.   
The assessment of these programmes complements the policy messages given by the Commission in 
its annual Enlargement Package. While the economic chapters of the latter assess only past 
developments in the countries, the assessments of the PEPs are forward looking. They analyse 
government medium-term plans, crucial for eventual full compliance with the Copenhagen economic 
criteria for accession.  
The PEPs have developed into increasingly important platforms for the authorities to develop and 
communicate consistent economic, fiscal and structural policies over the medium term.  Their 
preparation serves a twofold purpose: to strengthen economic planning capacity in the countries as 
such and to specifically prepare them for participation in the economic policy co-ordination and 
budgetary surveillance mechanisms of Economic and Monetary Union.  Consequently, the timing, 
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scope and methodology of the PEPs follow closely reporting obligations of Member States 
participating in EMU.  The PEPs and their assessments are therefore discussed in a multilateral policy 
framework with Member States and candidate countries, ending with the annual policy dialogue of the 
ECOFIN Council with candidate countries.  The development of the institutional capacity to co-
ordinate between the various ministries, government agencies and the central bank is a particularly 
important aspect ensuring the success of the Pre-Accession Fiscal Surveillance Procedure.  
The experience with the PEPs has shown that the positive results in terms of building up 
administrative and policy planning capacity and of designing conducive and consistent policies are 
powerful, but that they take time to accumulate and to materialise. 
1.2.1. The 2009 Programmes  
Countries were requested to submit their programmes by 31 January 2009.  Croatia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia complied with this deadline, while Turkey submitted its programme 
with a delay due to its on-going discussions with the IMF.  All three programmes have been made 
public.1  
In the case of the assessment of the 2009 PEPs one important caveat has to be made: 
• When analysing the programmes, the EU Commission assesses whether the provided information 
is in line with the required standards and whether the programme's overall scenario is plausible 
and consistent at the time of submission. In the case of the assessment of the 2009 programmes, 
the global economic environment departed quite significantly from what appeared plausible at the 
time of drafting the programmes of Croatia and of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In 
the meantime the global environment had changed dramatically, with a sharp decline in global 
demand and major turbulences and uncertainties on the financial markets. As a result, when 
commission services assessed them, these two programmes appeared to be fairly optimistic. In the 
case of Turkey, the main macro-economic assumptions of the programme were deemed as broadly 
realistic, also given the late submission which allowed for a more accurate assessment of the fall-
out from the international crisis. 
With this limitation in mind, the main elements of the assessment are the following:  
• the programmes present overall consistent and partly ambitious policy frameworks for economic 
stabilisation, fiscal prudence and structural reforms.  Their methodology and presentation has 
further improved in some areas compared to previous submissions.  However, in all programmes 
there is still room for further improvement, in particular in view of presenting more explicitly the 
link between the discussed reforms and the country's EU accession process.  Overall, countries 
appear committed to strengthen administrative capacities and to prepare for eventually joining the 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
• the programmes are based on – in principle – consistent macroeconomic and fiscal frameworks.  
However, in the meantime, the rapidly changing international environment has rendered most of 
the programmes' economic set-up outdated. At the time of submission, Croatia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia expected a rather moderate growth slowdown in 2009 and a 
clear recovery in 2010 and 2011. Croatia envisaged a deceleration from 2.5% in 2008 to 2.0% in 
2009 and an acceleration by about one percentage point in each of the following years. The former 
 
                                                          
1  Croatia: http://www.mfin.hr/adminmax/docs/2008_PEP%20eng.pdf   
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia: http://www.finance.gov.mk/files/u9/PEP_Macedonia_2009-2011.pdf  
Turkey: http://www.dpt.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebIcerikGosterim.aspx?IcerikRef=4022&WorkArea=ctl38 
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Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia expected a deceleration from 6% in 2008 to 5.5% in 2009 and a 
growth acceleration to 6% and 7% in 2010 and 2011. These assumptions –at the time of 
submission and even more so at present – appear overly optimistic for both countries and will have 
to be revisited. Partly due to Turkey's later submission, the programme was able to include more 
recent information, suggesting a stronger GDP decline, by 3.6% in 2009. For the remaining 
programme period, the Turkish programme was also rather optimistic, expecting a recovery of 
3.3% in 2010 and a further acceleration to 4.5% growth in 2011.  
• the economic frameworks for Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia foresee a 
mild slowdown, while the overall trend of capital deepening and efficiency improvements is seen 
to continue. From the demand side, a strengthening domestic demand – in particular solid 
consumption and investment – will support growth, which is expected to mitigate consequences 
from the worsening external environment. However, risks to the programmes are much more 
elevated than last year, in particular with respect to external demand and capital inflows, notably 
tourist revenues, workers remittances, FDI and portfolio investment. In Croatia, and in particular 
in the case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the presented macroeconomic 
framework probably was too optimistic for being used as a realistic planning tool. A more detailed 
analysis of the at that time already substantial downward risks would therefore have been 
welcome. 
• the fiscal frameworks foresee for Croatia a gradual narrowing of the deficit, while the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia envisages a significant rise in the deficit. In Croatia, the general 
government accounts are projected to improve from a deficit of -1.3% of GDP in 2008 to a 
balanced budget in 2011, which is less ambitious than last year's submission. The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia plans a significant increase in the deficit from -1.0% of GDP in 2007 to -
2.8% of GDP during the whole programme period, reflecting a lowering of the tax burden while 
increasing capital investment. In the case of Turkey, the programme expects a rise in the fiscal 
deficit from 1.4% of GDP in 2008 to 4.6% in 2009. In 2010 and 2011, the deficits are expected to 
narrow to 3.2% of GDP and 2.8%, respectively. The achievement of such objectives under 
conditions of likely revenue shortfalls and increased social expenditure is likely to require 
vigorous budget rebalancing measures. In the case of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
while the lower level of public debt leaves a marginally larger fiscal space than in the case of 
Croatia, the wider current account deficit nevertheless leaves limited scope for the foreseen 
expansionary fiscal stance that may exacerbate the country's external imbalances. In the case of 
Turkey, the fiscal relaxation in 2009 may affect the quality of public spending, while fiscal risks 
are significant over the programme period, given the rather optimistic revenues projections. 
• the structural reform agendas, as presented in the 2009 PEPs, cover a broad range of policies and 
reveal a varying degree of ambition. Croatia's emphasis is put on economic restructuring, and 
reform of labour markets, agriculture and the health system.  The programme of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia focuses on improving the transport and communication, 
agriculture, business environment, and regional development.  In the case of Turkey, the emphasis 
of structural reforms is to increase the efficiency in the private sector and of public administration 
and to strengthen the functioning of the market economy, also by continuing the ambitious 
privatisation agenda in the energy sector. Often, however, the PEPs are very detailed when 
describing past developments and rather vague when explaining intended reform measures.  
Furthermore, the links between the structural reforms outlined and the macroeconomic and fiscal 
frameworks would have benefitted from a more explicit discussion.  Overall, the full and 
determined implementation of those reforms should strengthen their economies, in particular in 
view of their increasing EU integration.  
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Croatia 5.6 2.5 2.0 3.2 4.0
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 5.9 6.0 5.5 6.0 7.0
Turkey 4.7 1.1 -3.6 3.3 4.5
Croatia 9.6 8.7 8.5 8.0 7.4
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 34.9 33.7 33.5 33.0 32.4
Turkey 9.9 10.6 13.5 13.9 13.9
Croatia -8.6 -10.5 -7.8 -6.9 -6.4
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia -7.2 -11.3 -11.1 -10.2 -10.1
Turkey -5.9 -5.7 -1.9 -3.0 -4.0
Croatia 2.9 6.1 3.5 3.2 3.0
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2.3 8.3 3.5 2.8 2.8
Turkey 8.4 9.6 7.1 6.5 5.6
Croatia -1.6 -1.3 -0.9 -0.6 0.0
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia -0.8 -1.5 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8
Turkey -0.2 -1.4 -4.6 -3.2 -2.8
Croatia 37.8 36.1 35.1 33.8 31.8
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 24.7 21.4 22.7 24.7 25.8
Turkey 39.5 43.1 44.1 43.4
Source: PEP 2009
Table I.1.1:
Real GDP growth (% change)     
General government gross debt (% of GDP)     
Pre-Accession Economic Programmes 2009-11 : Key indicators
Unemployment rate (%, LFS)
Current account balance (% of GDP)
Inflation (CPI, annual % change)
General government balance (% of GDP) 
 
1.2.2. Crisis related policy issues  
In the context of the present dramatic deterioration of the global economy, the discussion on the 
appropriate policy response has to take into account the specific situations in each affected country. 
However, important common elements are: 
• Given the relatively small size of their economies – even Turkey's economy is roughly of a size 
between the economy of Belgium and of the Netherlands - and their high degree of trade openness, 
the design of counter-cyclical measures in the present crisis context need to take into account that 
a number of traditional demand stimulating measures tend to have a rather limited impact on the 
local economy and may rather exacerbate external imbalances.  
• The financing of substantial spending plans might not be possible through tax revenues, at times of 
decelerating output and declining inflation. Credit financing on the domestic sector risks to crowd 
out domestic investors, while tapping international financial markets could be rather difficult and 
expensive, given the current scarcity on financial markets. In particular in the case of Croatia, 
increasing the stock of foreign debt appears rather challenging as well as its roll-over, with 
sizeable maturities falling due in 2009.  
• Furthermore, rapidly increasing external indebtedness could erode confidence of financial markets 
in the countries' solvency, which could lead to tensions in the countries' foreign exchange markets, 
requiring further increases in interest rates. Even Turkey that went through a drastic fiscal 
consolidation between 2002 and 2008, could see some of its benefits jeopardized. 
To enhance the countries' resilience to the crisis, improvements in the prioritisation of budget 
expenditure and revenue measures could play a key role, in particular by better targeting those 
measures that contribute to the functioning of the market economy and to raising the countries' 
competitiveness. In case additional counter-cyclical public expenditure is approved, it will need to be 
financed from savings elsewhere in the budget. Overall, establishing the appropriate policy mix has 
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become significantly more challenging than in previous years, which makes the pursuit of a prudent 
fiscal policy even more important.  
1.2.3. The PEPs and pre-accession strategy  
The programmes lay out policy strategies which are to a large degree compatible with and conducive 
to the economic priorities of the Accession Partnerships and, more widely, to the general objective of 
meeting the Copenhagen economic criteria for accession, i.e. establishing a functioning market 
economy and raising competitiveness to a level which would allow the countries to meet competitive 
pressure within the European Union1.  In some cases, though, clearer and more convincing 
information on the specific implementation of these objectives would have been useful. 
Technical assistance to candidate countries in the area of economic policy planning and 
implementation has proven powerful and should be continued. 
1.2.4. Follow-up  
The programmes and their assessments by the Commission services were discussed within multilateral 
policy dialogues between Member States and candidate countries.  A special meeting of the Alternates 
of the Economic and Financial Committee with representatives of candidate countries took place on 
15 April 2009 and discussed and assessed the individual programmes of Croatia and the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. As Turkey had submitted its programme only a few days before the 
meeting, only a very general discussion took place on Turkey's programme. On 20-21 April, a High-
level meeting between the EFC and representatives of the candidate countries was held and the draft 
conclusions prepared at the Alternates level were endorsed.  The Ministerial Meeting between the 
ECOFIN and their counterparts from the candidate countries took place on 5 May 2009. The Council's 
presidency adopted and published the conclusions of the two countries which had submitted their 
programmes in time.  
This exercise has been, since its start, an annual one.  Therefore, the countries will again be invited to 
submit a programme, covering the period 2010-2012.  
(1) So far, the Commission considers Turkey and Croatia to have achieved the status of a fully functioning market economy, 
while the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is seen to be well advanced as regards meeting the economic criteria 
and to have moved closer towards becoming a functioning market economy.  
1. CROATIA 
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1.1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Croatia's fifth Pre-Accession Economic Programme (“PEP 2009-2011”), submitted in February 2009 
presents a sufficiently comprehensive and broadly consistent macroeconomic and fiscal framework 
which is however based on overly optimistic macroeconomic projections, undermining the usefulness 
of the document as a basis for economic policy making. The programme’s overarching objectives are: 
enabling sustainable growth, reducing unemployment and increasing employment levels as well as 
ensuring social fairness.  The document largely complies with the content, form and data 
requirements and appears consistent with earlier key policy documents and the 2009 budget adopted 
in December.   
Economic performance slowed markedly in 2008 and in early 2009 as a result of the global financial 
crisis.  Tighter financing conditions as well as asset price adjustments have lowered domestic demand 
and exports to Croatia's main trading partners in the EU declined. Inflation has decelerated from its 
peak in mid-2008, mainly as a result of lower commodity and energy prices as well as slowing 
domestic demand, but picked up again in early 2009. The unemployment rate has increased recently 
and total employment growth has fallen. The current account deficit continued to increase and was 
more than financed by net capital inflows, despite lower net foreign direct investments. The large 
stock of external debt and important short-term debt repayment obligations of the government and 
corporate sector are key challenges against the background of much tighter financing conditions and a 
possible slowdown in capital inflows. At the same time, a comfortable stock of international reserves 
and banking sector foreign assets will serve as a cushion in the event of lower external financing. The 
financial sector remained stable with the mostly foreign-owned banking sector still benefiting from 
earlier recapitalisations. 
The PEP's GDP growth and employment projections appeared overly optimistic at the time of 
submission, against the background of the growth slowdown in Croatia's major EU trading partners. 
Moreover, external financing constraints may limit the scope for corporate sector investment. The 
slowdown in private consumption growth could be stronger than projected, resulting from lower 
employment and disposable income, negative wealth effects from asset price adjustments, tighter 
borrowing conditions and a general decline in consumer confidence in a situation of heightened 
uncertainty. Reaching growth rates close to potential, as projected for 2010 and 2011, may require a 
longer than envisaged adjustment process. The inflation outlook of the programme appears broadly 
reasonable with limited upside risks. Also, a continuation of the stability-oriented monetary policy 
framework may help preventing a significant re-acceleration of inflation over the medium term.  
The PEP projects a gradual reduction of the current account deficit, which appears plausible. The 
growth of exports will be significantly affected by lower demand of Croatia's main trading partner, but 
total imports are likely to have a larger impact on the current account, due to the combined effect of 
lower prices for energy and commodities and a significant deceleration of domestic consumption and 
investment. Moreover, external financing constraints, including less scope for FDI inflows, may also 
lead towards a reduction of external balances. The main risks to the programme are clearly associated 
with the possibility of more pronounced negative effects of the global financial crisis on the real and 
financial sector. A long lasting downturn in Croatia's major EU trading partners would certainly affect 
prospects for an early resumption of growth as projected by the PEP. 
The fiscal programme 2009-2011 envisages a gradual improvement of the consolidated general 
government balance, turning from an expected deficit of 1.3% of GDP in 2008 to a balanced budget 
European Commission 
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by 2011. This is based on a reduction of total spending by around 2.5 percentage points of GDP over 
2008-2011, which does not appear to be fully backed by specific policy measures. Some measures, 
especially in the social area, imply an increase in spending. The revenue-to-GDP ratio is planned to 
decline by 1.3 percentage points, however, revenue projections are based on overly optimistic growth 
assumptions, and revenue shortfalls are very likely to emerge. The general government debt ratio is 
projected to fall by around 4.3 percentage points, from a projected 36.1% of GDP in 2008 to 31.8% of 
GDP in 2011, mainly driven by an improvement of the primary balance and an acceleration of 
nominal GDP growth.  
The general direction of continued fiscal adjustment to ensure long-term sustainability of public 
finances remains appropriate in view of high spending ratios and significant external vulnerabilities 
emanating from a high level of external debt and large short term debt service obligations. However, 
the programme contains limited information on key fiscal measures and their respective quantitative 
effects. Moreover, the envisaged gradual approach of balancing the budget only by 2011 appears less 
ambitious compared to the previous PEP and earlier government intentions and may not sufficiently 
reflect much tighter external financing constraints. Fiscal risks are strongly linked to the likelihood of 
a much weaker growth performance, which will trigger a significant shortfall in revenues. Additional 
risks may result from a slower than envisaged implementation of reforms which could delay the 
realisation of budget savings, especially in the area of subsidies and transfers. The authorities may 
also be confronted with spending pressures as the current unfolding of the financial crisis may lead to 
calls for an increase of discretionary spending to counterbalance its negative effects on growth and 
employment. The combined effect of markedly lower fiscal revenues and a higher current spending 
would seriously undermine the urgently needed fiscal consolidation. Therefore, an appropriate fiscal 
response under current circumstances would require immediate and bold fiscal measures, including 
spending cuts and contingency planning, beyond those explained in the programme, in order to bring 
spending plans in line with emerging revenue shortfalls and tighter financing constraints.  
The PEP 2009-2011 covers a broad range of structural reforms related to the enterprise and financial 
sector, labour market, agricultural sector, public administration, education, health care, judiciary, and 
environment.  The presentation is often backward looking, providing information on past and ongoing 
reform initiatives with a strong focus on harmonisation with EU requirements. More emphasis could 
have been given to measures aimed at improving the business environment, given the pertaining 
administrative obstacles still in place. The programme contains fiscal estimates on some measures, but 
the link between the structural reform agenda and the implementation of the fiscal strategy could be 
further strengthened. The full implementation of the structural reform agenda would in some cases 
require the establishment of time bound action plans and the definition of concrete measures and clear 
targets. On such a basis, reforms would be conducive to meeting the objectives of the Lisbon agenda 
concerning product, labour and capital markets and the establishment of a knowledge based economy. 
Intensified efforts to speed up the implementation of reforms, in particular in the areas of enterprise 
restructuring, education and labour markets would be supportive to the fulfilment of the second 
Copenhagen economic criteria over the medium term. The structural reform agenda largely reflects 
the main accession-related policy requirements, but falls somewhat short in fully addressing the 
economic priorities of the Accession Partnership of February 2008 and the policy challenges 
identified in the 2008 Progress Report.  
1.2. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 1 February 2009, Croatia submitted its fifth Pre-Accession Economic Programme, following 
government adoption and earlier consultation of social partners.  The programme covers the period 
2009-2011 and represents an update of the previous years' submission. It builds on earlier policy 
documents, such as the "Strategic Development Framework for 2006-2013" and the "Economic and 
Fiscal Policy Guidelines 2009-2011".  The document largely complies with the content, form and data 
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requirements.  Comments and suggestions by the Commission made in its last years' PEP assessment 
have been taken on board and led to technical improvements. The PEP presents a sufficiently 
comprehensive and broadly consistent macroeconomic framework. However, its growth projections 
appear overly optimistic at the time of submission, and consequently lead to a rather unrealistic fiscal 
scenario. The programme’s overarching objectives are: enabling sustainable growth, reducing 
unemployment and increasing employment levels as well as ensuring social fairness. The structural 
reform agenda puts emphasis on a continuation of enterprise restructuring and social reforms, but falls 
short in fully addressing the economic priorities of the Accession Partnership and the key challenges 
identified in the 2008 Progress Report. 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Real GDP growth (% change) COM 5.6 3.5 3.0 4.0 n.a.
(% change) PEP 2008 5.6 2.5 2.0 3.2 4.0
Consumer price inflation (%) COM 2.9 6.5 4.5 4.0 n.a.
PEP 2008 2.9 6.1 3.5 3.2 3.0
General government balance (% of GDP) COM -2.8 -2.3 -2.5 -2.4 n.a.
PEP 2008 -1.6 -1.3 -0.9 -0.6 0.0
Primary balance (% of GDP) COM -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 n.a.
PEP 2008 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.3
Government gross debt (% of GDP) COM 37.7 35.8 35.4 34.3 n.a.
PEP 2008 37.8 36.1 35.1 33.8 31.8
Table II.1.1:
2009 Pre-accession Economic Programme: Key indicators
Source: 2009 PEP, Commission Autumn 2008 forecast  
1.3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
1.3.1. Recent macroeconomic developments 
Economic performance slowed markedly in 2008. Real GDP growth decelerated to 2.4%, down from 
5.5% in 2007. The slowdown came on the back of a marked deceleration of household consumption to 
0.8% year-on-year, down from 6.2% in 2007, while the growth of total investment accelerated to 
8.2%, from 6.5% a year before.  The first two months of 2009 saw a further deterioration of economic 
performance as evidenced by falling industrial production and retail trade as well as an increase in 
stocks of manufactured goods. In line with slowing domestic demand, inflation continued to 
decelerate to 2.8% year-on-year in December, from its peak of 8.6% in July, but re-accelerated 
slightly in early 2009, mainly as a result of administrative price adjustments. Employment increased 
by around 1% on average in 2008, but recent trends point to declining employment levels and a rise in 
the unemployment rate. A tightened monetary policy helped stabilising domestic credit expansion to 
the non-banking sector, which decelerated from 15% in 2007 to 10.5% in 2008. The current account 
deficit increased to 9.5% of GDP, up from 7.6% in 2007, largely driven by lower net exports and a 
higher deficit of the income balance, also reflecting higher debt servicing costs. The current account 
balance was more than financed by net capital inflows, despite lower net inflows of foreign direct 
investments which amounted to 5.9% of GDP. Overall, the impact of the financial crisis has 
contributed largely to the marked slowdown of the Croatian economy. Tighter financing conditions as 
well as asset price adjustments have lowered domestic demand while foreign demand suffered from 
declining exports to Croatia's main trading partners in the EU.  
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The PEP provides a concise and up-to-date overview of recent macroeconomic developments at the 
time of submission.  It provides useful explanations for deviations of actual developments from 
estimates presented in the previous PEP.   
1.3.2. Key policy challenges 
Continued fiscal consolidation coupled with productivity enhancing structural reforms should play a 
key role in the narrowing of the country's savings-investment gap and in reducing the present heavy 
reliance on foreign savings. A continuation of a prudent monetary policy aimed at stabilising the 
exchange rate seems essential to anchor market expectations under more severe external financing 
constraints and to preserve financial sector stability. This policy mix needs to be supported by 
comprehensive structural reforms, particularly in areas which have a direct effect on public finance 
and its long-term sustainability. Notably, reforms should be directed in rendering current spending 
more effective, in particular in the area of health care and social benefit spending. A particular 
challenge will be to reduce the heavy reliance of the shipbuilding and railway sector on state subsides 
through an acceleration of sector restructuring. Progress in reforms has been slow over recent years 
and more determination seems necessary if the key objectives of the PEP were to be met.   
The PEP 2009-2011 presents a comprehensive medium-term macroeconomic programme with 
projections for key economic variables, covering real sector, employment, wage, inflation as well as 
external developments. The growth projections have been significantly revised downwards from last 
year's PEP scenario, taking into account a much less favourable external environment. However, the 
macroeconomic scenario still appears overly optimistic, especially with respect to growth and 
employment projections in 2009 and 2010. The PEP does not explicitly discuss alternative scenarios. 
In the present context the programme could usefully have presented a more detailed assessment of 
risks related to the financial crisis and the recession in the EU and its possible effects on the 
macroeconomic programme.  
The external assumptions of the PEP 2009-2011 have markedly changed in line with a considerably 
less benign external outlook, but appear still optimistic. For 2009, the programme assumes world and 
EU 27 real growth rates of 2.9% and 0.2%, respectively, two percentage points lower than in last 
year's PEP. The volume of world imports is assumed to grow by 2.2%, down from 8.2% in the 
previous PEP. Oil prices in 2009 are projected at 68 US-$ per barrel, which is 7 US-$ lower.  
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) 5.6 5.6 3.5 2.5 3.0 2.0 4.0 3.2 n.a. 4.0
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand 6.4 6.4 4.3 3.9 3.6 0.6 4.6 2.2 n.a. 3.2
- Change in inventories 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.2 -1.0 -0.1 0.1 n.a. 0.2
- External balance of goods and services -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -2.5 -0.7 2.4 -0.6 0.9 n.a. 0.6
Employment (% change) 1.8 1.8 1.0 1.2 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.9 n.a. 1.2
Unemployment rate (%) 9.6 9.6 9.2 8.7 9.0 8.5 8.7 8.0 n.a. 7.4
GDP deflator (% change) 4.0 4.0 7.1 6.2 4.2 3.7 4.7 3.5 n.a. 3.2
Table II.1.2:
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
CPI inflation (%) 2.9 2.9 6.5 6.1 4.5 3.5 4.0 3.2 n.a. 3.0
Current account balance (% of GDP) -8.6 -8.6 -10.5 -10.5 -10.2 -7.8 -9.4 -6.9 n.a. -6.4
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme 2009; Commission Spring Forecast
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Real sector 
The PEP projects a further mild slowdown of real growth to 2% in 2009, down from an expected 2.5% 
in 2008, before it accelerates to 3.2% in 2010 and to 4% in 2011 on the assumption of a gradual 
recovery of the world economy. The temporary growth slowdown in 2009 is primarily the result of 
slowing domestic demand. Private and public consumption growth rates are projected to decelerate to 
around 1% each, and investment growth to turn slightly negative, to -1.1% from an expected 8% in 
2008. Apart from strong base effects, this decline results from lower government investments as some 
large infrastructure projects were completed in 2008. It however also reflects a significant reduction of 
corporate sector investments, reflecting tighter external financing conditions and a slack in business 
confidence. The growth of exports of goods and services is expected to fall in line with lower foreign 
demand from the main EU trading partners. However, the contribution of net exports to growth in 
2009 is actually projected to turn positive, as the volume of total imports will fall by around 3%. For 
2010 and 2011, the PEP projects a strengthening of the economy, supported by an improved business 
climate and a continuation of productivity enhancing structural reforms. Growth rates of private 
consumption and of total investments are expected to resume to 2.7% and 4.2%, respectively, by 
2011.  
Overall, the PEP's growth projections appear overly optimistic at the time of submission, in particular 
with respect to 2009, given the marked deterioration of the external environment, including a 
projected growth slowdown in Croatia's major EU trading partners. Moreover, external financing 
constraints are likely to limit the scope for corporate sector investment and the reduction in total 
investments could actually be stronger than projected by the PEP. Also, the slowdown in private 
consumption growth could be much more pronounced in 2009, resulting from lower employment and 
disposable incomes, negative wealth effects from asset price adjustments, tighter borrowing 
conditions and a general decline in consumer confidence in a situation of heightened uncertainty. It 
seems that those effects have been underestimated in the programme. The assumption of a growth 
recovery in 2010 and 2011 appears reasonable. However, reaching growth rates close to potential 
growth may require a longer than envisaged adjustment process.  
On labour market developments, the PEP projects employment growth to fall to 0.4% in 2009, from 
1.2% in 2008, and to slightly accelerate again to 1.2% by 2011. The unemployment rate (ILO) will 
continue to fall, to 7.4% at the end of the PEP horizon. It is somewhat surprising that the slowdown in 
growth in 2008 and 2009 does not have stronger effects on employment and unemployment levels. 
Overall, the programme may underestimate the negative effects of a rapidly slowing economy on 
labour market dynamics.   
Inflation 
As a result of higher commodity and energy prices as well as still relatively strong domestic demand, 
annual inflation increased significantly in the first half 2008, reaching its peak of 8.7% year-on-year in 
July. Since then, annual inflation has come down to 2.9% in December as energy prices have fallen 
significantly. As a result of price dynamics, average inflation in 2008 stood at 6.1%, up from 2.9% a 
year before. The PEP projects a marked reduction in average inflation to 3.5% in 2009, and a further 
gradual adjustment to 3% at the end of the PEP period. The projection is based on a stable exchange 
rate of the kuna against the euro, lower food and energy prices on world markets and a marked 
deceleration of domestic demand. The PEP assumes that cost push pressures will remain limited as the 
growth of unit labour costs will slow down.  
The inflation outlook of the programme appears broadly reasonable, also in the context of the outlined 
policy mix. However, there a number of risks related both to foreign and domestic factors. On the 
external front, higher prices for imported raw material are likely to be translated into higher inflation. 
Domestically, stronger inflationary pressures could result from stronger wage increases, if public 
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sector pay increases cannot be contained and spill over to the private sector. Moreover, necessary 
alignments of indirect taxes (e.g. excises) as well as further adjustments of administrative prices could 
add to prices increases. At the same time it is reasonable to assume that a continuation of the stability-
oriented monetary policy framework will help preventing a significant re-acceleration of inflation over 
the medium term.  
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
The present policy framework, which has been in place for many years, is often labelled as a tightly 
managed floating regime. The primary policy objective is price stability, and the exchange rate has 
traditionally and successfully been used as a stabilisation devise, conducive to anchoring inflationary 
expectations. The PEP rightly argues that the choice for such a regime is largely determined by the 
fact that Croatia is a small, open economy with a large degree of financial euroisation. The latter could 
imply significant risks due to balance sheets mismatches of the private corporate and non-corporate 
sector. Under these conditions, exchange rate stabilisation becomes an objective in itself to safeguard 
financial sector stability. As a consequence, the room for a discretionary monetary policy remains 
very limited. Administrative and prudential measures were taken over recent years to contain credit 
growth, domestic demand and inflation and have led to a stronger resilience of the domestic banking 
sector. More recently, the focus has shifted towards measures aimed at improving foreign exchange 
liquidity to domestic markets with a view to mitigating the effects of the global financial crisis (see 
Box 1).  
External sector 
The PEP projects a marked reduction of the current account deficit in 2009, to 7.8% of GDP from 
10.5% in 2008, and a further gradual adjustment to 6.4% of GDP by 2011. These assumptions appear 
plausible. Although the growth of exports will be significantly affected by lower demand of Croatia's 
main trading partner, reduced total imports are likely to have a much larger impact on the current 
account, due to the combined effect of lower prices for energy and commodities and a significant 
deceleration of domestic consumption and investment.  Moreover, a reduction of the current account 
deficit appears also plausible, given external financing constraints. On this issue, the PEP remains 
rather vague. It however admits that scope for financing through FDI will be limited in 2009 while 
some inflows related to greenfield investments are expected after 2009.  
Main risks 
The main risks to the macroeconomic scenario are clearly associated with the possibility of more 
pronounced negative effects of the global financial crisis on the real and financial sector. A longer 
lasting downturn in the major EU trading partners will certainly affect prospects for an early 
resumption of growth as projected by the PEP. Risks are somewhat elevated due to significant 
external vulnerabilities emanating from a high level of external debt and large debt service obligations 
coming due, particularly in 2009. The programme would have deserved a more in-depth discussion of 
those issues, including possible options for matching important external financing requirement.    
1.4. PUBLIC FINANCE 
 
The fiscal programme of the PEP 2009-2011 is presented as an integral part of - and supportive to - 
the overall medium-term economic policy framework, which aims at enabling sustainable growth, 
reducing unemployment and increasing employment levels as well as ensuring social fairness. The 
general direction of continued fiscal adjustment to ensure long-term sustainability of public finances 
remains unchanged and broadly appropriate in view of high spending ratios and significant external 
vulnerabilities emanating from a high level of external debt and large short term debt service 
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obligations as well as under conditions of much tighter financing constraints. However, fiscal targets 
are less ambitious compared to last year's PEP and the envisaged gradual approach of balancing the 
budget by only 2011 may not sufficiently reflect much tighter external financing constraints. 
Moreover, there are serious risks that the actual fiscal outcome could be much less comfortable than 
projected in the programme. The programme contains limited information on key fiscal measures and 
their respective quantitative effects. A short assessment on the cyclical position of the economy and 
the cyclically adjusted profile of fiscal policy is provided, but the programme would have benefited 
from a more in-depth discussion of the working of automatic stabilisers in the context of an economic 
slowdown.  The sensitivity analysis is welcome, but potential fiscal risks appear to be much more 
elevated than those presented in the various scenarios. The programme makes an attempt to apply 
ESA 95 standards and fiscal data are broadly consistent with those presented in the recent fiscal 
notification submitted in April 2008. 
-5
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Graph II.1.1: Budgetary developments 
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The fiscal programme envisages a gradual improvement of the consolidated general government 
balance, turning from an expected deficit of 1.3% of GDP in 2008 to a balanced budget in 2011. The 
primary surplus will gradually increase from 0.4% of GDP to 2% of GDP.  Fiscal consolidation is 
based on a reduction of the public spending ratio (including net acquisition of non-financial assets) by 
around 2.5 percentage points of GDP in the three-year period (from 46.9% of GDP in 2008 to 44.4% 
in 2011).  In particular, spending on transfers, subsidies, wages, and investments is, relative to GDP, 
programmed to be reduced.  At the same time, the revenue-to-GDP ratio is planned to decline by 1.3 
percentage points over 2008 to 2011.  The general government debt ratio is projected to fall by around 
4.3 percentage points, from a projected 36.1% of GDP in 2008 to 31.8% of GDP in 2011, mainly 
driven by an improvement of the primary balance and an acceleration of nominal GDP growth. 
1.4.1. Budget implementation in 2008 
 
As for the year 2008, the original budget framework presented in last years' PEP (and adopted in late 
2007) foresaw a deficit target for the consolidated general government sector of 1.5% of GDP, down 
from 1.6% in 2007.  In mid-2008, the government proposed and the parliament adopted a revision of 
the 2008 budget with a slightly lower than originally planned deficit (1.3% of GDP). The budget 
revision provided for higher than originally projected revenues. Additional budget revenues were, as 
in previous years, partly used to repay health sector arrears, but also to compensate private households 
for higher energy prices, and to provide additional funds for regional development as well as for 
science and education. Unfortunately, the PEP does not provide sufficient information on budget 
execution in 2008, which is a major shortcoming. Data presented for the first three quarters of 2008 
suggest that budget implementation has been broadly in line with the revised plan. Available 
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preliminary data for the central government point to a underperformance of total revenues by 2 
percentage points of GDP for the whole year. This shortfall has been largely matched by an 
adjustment of current spending. However, official available data are largely cash based, and do not yet 
fully account for changes in general government arrears, debt assumptions and other factors that in 
past years have had a significant impact on the deficit as defined under ESA 95, such as so-called 
pensioners' debt and activities of the State Development Bank (HBOR). 
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 Box II.1.1: The global financial crisis: first impact and policy response.
The global financial crisis and economic slowdown in Croatia's main trading partners have started to affect the
Croatian economy. Growth decelerated markedly, external imbalances widened and economic prospects have become
much bleaker. The large stock of external debt and important short-term debt repayment obligations of the government
and corporate sector are key challenges against the background of much tighter financing conditions and a possible
slowdown in capital inflows. A comfortable stock of international reserves and banking sector foreign assets will serve
as a cushion in the event of lower external financing. The financial sector remained stable with the mostly foreign-
owned banking sector still benefiting from earlier recapitalisations. 
The Croatian authorities adopted a number of measures to mitigate potential shocks that may arise from the financial
crisis. In October, the guaranteed amount of household deposits was increased four times (to € 56,000). The majority
of measures that were taken in the following months were aimed at improving domestic and foreign exchange liquidity
of the banking system under circumstances of tighter external financing conditions and at stabilising the exchange rate. 
Monetary Policy – administrative and regulatory measures.  
*  In October 2008, the Croatian National Bank (CNB) abolished the marginal reserve requirement on bank's foreign
borrowing, thereby injecting foreign exchange liquidity of approximately EUR 460 million. 
*  In November 2008, the CNB reduced the banks' reserve requirement rate from 17% to 14%, thereby releasing an
amount of HRK 8.4 billion (around EUR 1.2 billion) additional liquidity to the banking sector, also  to facilitate
government financing without crowding out private sector activities. This was later (in January 2009) followed by
changes in the currency allocation of the reserve requirement with an estimated effect of EUR 780 million. 
*  In 2009, CNB took several steps to ease tensions and excessive fluctuations in the foreign exchange markets and to
discourage speculative activities. In order to mitigate depreciation pressures on the kuna, the CNB intervened twice
in the foreign exchange market, by selling EUR 328 million in January and EUR 184 million in February,
respectively. In end-February, the CNB intervened again, this time by purchasing EUR 331 million in order to
provide domestic currency liquidity following significant increases in inter-bank rates.  
*  In February 2009, the central bank gradually reduced the rate of the minimum required reserves on foreign currency
claims from 28.5% to 20% in two steps, thereby providing a total of above EUR 2 billion in foreign exchange
liquidity to the domestic banking sector.  
Fiscal policy measures 
*  The Minister of Finance announced to finance part of the 2009 budget deficit on foreign markets through a bond
issue planned for May. Debt obligations which came due in the first quarter, amounting to EUR 750 million, were
successfully financed through a syndicated loan from the largest 6 domestic banks.  
*  In February, the government announced an anti-recession programme consisting of 10 measures, including a
planned revision of the state budget, a financial strengthening of the State Development Bank (HBOR), and support
for the tourism, SMEs and the real estate market.  
*  A government's proposal for a budget revision was adopted on 25 March. It reportedly contains a 4% spending 
cut, which does not fully compensate for the projected loss in revenues, so that the general government budget 
deficit is set to increase to 1.6% of GDP.  
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Near- and medium-term budget strategy  
For the year 2009 and in line with the budget framework adopted in late 2008, the programme projects 
a reduction of spending and revenues, as measured as a percentage of GDP, by 0.8 and 0.5 percentage 
points, respectively. Accordingly, the general government deficit will fall by 0.4 percentage points to 
0.9% of GDP. The slowdown in annual revenue growth to 4.6%, from 8.2% in 2008, appears broadly 
consistent with the projected lowering of GDP growth, assuming that the tax elasticity does not 
change in the short term. A surprising element is however the one-off increase in property income in 
2009 by almost 50% year-on-year which is not explained in the document, but may be related to the 
transfer of surplus from the CNB to the budget. Moreover, revenue projections are based on growth 
assumptions, which are likely to be overly optimistic, as outlined earlier below. A more realistic 
growth scenario would imply a larger shortfall in government revenues. The reduction of the 
expenditure-to-GDP ratio in 2009 is largely driven by lower investment (by 0.2 percentage points), 
which appears reasonable as some large infrastructure projects have been completed in 2008. The 
projected marked reduction of subsidies (by 0.4 percentage points of GDP or by 5.5% year-on-year) 
seems rather ambitious and is not fully consistent with the attached policy matrix. The latter indicates 
that the envisaged savings (e.g. a lowering of subsidies to the railway, shipbuilding and agricultural 
sectors) accounts for less than 0.1% of GDP. Spending on wages is projected to increase in 2009, as a 
percentage of GDP, probably reflecting the recent 6% public sector wage increase. An increase in 
spending on social transfers (by 0.4 percentage points of GDP) is only partly explained by the increase 
in social benefits and family support measures. The reduction of interest payments and of the implicit 
interest rate on outstanding public debt in 2009 (and beyond) does not appear to be consistent with 
current expectations about the pricing of Croatia's sovereign debt. Overall, the PEP's fiscal programme 
for 2009 is being overtaken by a major budget revision, most likely to be adopted in April 2009 (see 
also BOX).   
In 2010, the general government deficit is projected to further decline to 0.6% of GDP, before a 
balanced budget is reached in 2011. A major part of adjustment over these two years is planned to be 
realised through a reduction of primary spending with a particularly strong contribution of spending 
on social benefits (0.6 percentage points), subsidies (0.3 percentage points) and wages (0.6 percentage 
points). This appears rather ambitious and the programme itself does not elaborate on cost saving 
measures to support fiscal adjustment and spending contraction over the latter part of the PEP period.  
It would have particularly benefited from outlining a public sector employment and wage strategy that 
could back the envisaged reduction of the public sector wage bill.  
Fiscal risks are clearly related to the unrealistic growth assumptions of the programme (see below). A 
stronger cyclical downturn is expected to worsen the fiscal balance. Also, the revenue base is likely to 
shrink, especially for indirect taxes, as a result of the ongoing dis-inflation. Altogether, a much 
stronger decline in fiscal revenues than projected in the PEP is likely to materialise. Additional risks 
may result from a slower than envisaged implementation of reforms which could delay the realisation 
of budget savings. This refers particular to subsidies and transfers. The authorities may also be 
confronted with continued spending pressures, especially in the area of wages, as has been repeatedly 
the case in the past. Finally, the current unfolding of the financial crisis may lead to pressures to 
increase short-term discretionary spending to counterbalance the negative effects on growth and 
employment, and to higher costs of servicing outstanding public debt. The resulting combined effect 
of markedly lower fiscal revenues and pressures for higher current spending would seriously 
undermine the envisaged fiscal consolidation process. Therefore, an appropriate fiscal response under 
current circumstances would require bold fiscal measures, including spending cuts and contingency 
planning, beyond those explained in the programme, in order to bring spending plans in line with 
emerging financing and revenue constraints.  
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Structural balance 
The PEP 2009-2011 provides a short overview on the cyclical position of the economy and the impact 
of fiscal policy, using the same methodology in estimating cyclically adjusted primary balances as in 
last year's submission. On this basis, estimated potential growth exceeds projected real growth in 
2009, but falls below projected growth rates in 2010 and 2011. Total output falls below potential in 
2009 and 2010, before the output gap turns positive in 2011, resulting from the projected acceleration 
of growth toward the latter part of the PEP period. The cyclically adjusted primary balance constantly 
improves over the PEP period, by 0.1 percentage point per year. On this basis, the PEP concludes that 
fiscal policy has slightly restrictive and pro-cyclical effects in 2009 and 2010, and turns 
countercyclical in 2011. Given the methodological weaknesses, the statements on the effects of fiscal 
policy certainly need to be taken with a great deal of caution. There is scope for deepening the 
analysis in future submissions. 
Change:
2008-11
Revenues 46.0 45.7 45.2 44.8 44.4 -1.3
- Taxes and social security contributions 39.8 40.6 39.8 39.7 39.6 -1.0
    - Other (residual) 6.2 5.1 5.4 5.1 4.8 -0.3
Expenditure 47.6 46.9 46.1 45.4 44.4 -2.5
- Primary expenditure 45.6 45.1 44.5 43.9 43.1 -2.0
of which:
Gross fixed capital formation 4.3 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6 -0.3
Consumption 17.1 17.2 17.3 16.8 16.7 -0.5
Transfers & subsidies 20.2 20.5 20.5 20.4 19.9 -0.6
Other (residual) 4.0 4.5 4.0 4.0 3.9 -0.6
- Interest payments 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3 -0.5
Budget balance -1.6 -1.3 -0.9 -0.6 0.0 1.3
- Cyclically adjusted 0.5 0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.4 0.3
Primary balance 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.8
Gross debt level 37.8 36.1 35.1 33.8 31.8 -4.3
Table II.1.3:
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Composition of the budgetarty adjustment (in % of GDP)
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme 2009-2011, ECFIN calculations  
Debt levels and development, analysis of below-the-line operations and stock-flow 
adjustments 
The PEP 2009-2011 projects a baseline scenario of a gradual reduction of general government debt 
from 36.1% of GDP in 2008 to 31.8% of GDP in 2011.  Projections on the decomposition of changes 
in the debt ratio appear largely comprehensive and consistent with the macro-economic and fiscal 
assumptions.  The nominal GDP effect and the projected improvement of the primary balance over the 
PEP period have a marked effect on the reduction of the debt ratio. This effect is partially offset by 
interest payments which are projected to slightly fall from 1.6% to 1.3% of GDP. Interestingly, stock-
flow adjustments are projected to have only a minor impact on the debt ratio. In particular, the 
presented debt dynamics do not project any receipts from privatisation which is not entirely in line 
with the stated objectives in the economic policy matrix of the programme. It remains unclear why the 
intended acceleration in the sale of state assets would not yield any net revenues. The public debt 
sensitivity analysis presented in the PEP shows that the public debt ratio is particularly sensitive to a 
depreciation of the kuna-euro exchange rate, as around 80% of outstanding public debt is denominated 
in foreign currency. Also, a slightly more expansionary fiscal stance1 as well as an increase in 
contingent liabilities by 10% of GDP would lead to an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The analysis 
undertaken in the PEP is useful and confirms the need for continued fiscal discipline in order to ensure 
public debt sustainability. 
                                                          
 
1  Defined as keeping primary deficits in 2009 and 2010 at historical level minus two standard deviations 
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1.4.2. Budgetary implications of major structural reforms 
As required, the programme (in its Annex) presents some estimates of the fiscal impact of reforms 
envisaged over the PEP horizon, which is a useful complement.  A summary overview is presented in 
table 5 (under Chapter 5) of this assessment.  It shows that structural reforms will have an important 
impact on the country's fiscal position.  Namely, net spending is estimated to increase by 0.7% of 
GDP on average per year over the period 2009-2011. Some of the estimates presented and explicitly 
referred to in the PEP, notably on subsidy reduction to the enterprise sector do not appear to be 
entirely consistent with the medium-term budget scenario outlined in the fiscal programme.  
Gross debt ratio (1) 37.8 36.1 35.1 33.8 31.8
Change in the ratio -3.0 -1.7 -1.0 -1.4 -2.0
Contributions (2):
1. Primary balance -0.5 -0.5 -0.8 -0.8 -1.3
2. “Snow-ball” effect (2) -1.5 -1.3 -0.3 -0.8 -1.0
Of which:
Interest expenditure 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.3
Growth effect -2.1 -0.9 -0.7 -1.1 -1.3
Inflation effect -1.5 -2.2 -1.3 -1.2 -1.0
3. Stock-flow adjustment -0.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3
2008 2009 2010 2011
(1) End of period.
2007
Table II.1.4:
Composition of debt dynamics (in % of GDP)
(2)  The snow-ball effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on accumulated debt, as well as the impact of real GDP growth and 
inflation on the debt ratio (through the denominator). The stock-flow adjustment includes differences in cash and accrual accounting, 
accumulation of financial assets and valuation and other residual effects. 
Source:Pre-Accession Economic Programme(PEP); Commission services’ calculations  
1.4.3. Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous programme 
The PEP 2009-2011 includes an update of the sensitivity analysis presented in last year's submission.  
The first scenario assumes lower real growth rates, namely a zero growth in 2009 and a 50% lower 
growth rate in 2010. This leads to a deterioration of the fiscal balance, by 1.1 percentage points on 
average per year. The second scenario assumes a 50% lower revenue growth in 2009 and 2010, while 
real GDP growth rates are left unchanged.  This would result in even stronger deviations from 
baseline fiscal balances, by around 1.8 percentage point per year on average. Finally, the third 
scenario assumes a one-off increase in current spending by one billion kuna in 2009, leading to 
slightly higher fiscal deficits by around 0.3 percentage points on average over the reference period. 
The analysis is useful in demonstrating the sensitivity of the fiscal balance to changes in real growth, 
revenues and spending. However, deviations from the baseline scenario appear rather moderate and 
may not fully cover the magnitude of possible shocks, especially against the background of an already 
slowing economy and a much riskier external environment. Therefore, it would have been more 
appropriate to base the analysis on a set of more severe shocks to growth, revenues and spending. 
Also, a combination of lower growth, revenue underperformance and spending overrun cannot be 
excluded and could have even more serious effects on the fiscal balance. The PEP does not elaborate 
on possible counterbalancing measures to be taken in the event of risk occurrence.  It thus remains 
unclear how the fiscal strategy could respond in the short term in case significant deviations from the 
outlined fiscal path occur.   
1.4.4. Quality of public finance and institutional features 
 
The PEP 2009-2011 refers in a very general way to recent and ongoing institutional changes and 
policies which are seen to improve the quality of public finances over the medium term.  It emphasises 
improvements in budget management, revenue collection and expenditure control as well as the 
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adoption of a new public procurement system in line with EU practice and a new legal framework for 
public-private partnerships. On tax policy, the programme puts emphasis on further technical 
alignment with EU requirements. Changes to the tax-benefit system are not foreseen. The 
simplification of the tax system is – contrary to last year's submission – not mentioned as a policy 
objective. As in last year's PEP, public finances are expected to contribute to creating a knowledge-
based society through investments in science and education.  Also, a more balanced development 
across all regions of the country remains a priority. Overall, the programme expresses intentions to 
shift the composition of the budget toward growth-enhancing expenditure, but does not present 
medium-term spending targets in this respect.  
1.4.5. Sustainability of public finance 
The PEP 2009-2011 contains a short analysis of the long-term sustainability of public finances with a 
focus on pension, health and interest expenditure. Assumptions on long-term population trends as well 
as on participation rates have not been changed compared to last year's PEP. Differences to last year's 
scenario result primarily from the significant downward revision of GDP growth over the PEP period 
and slightly different fiscal balances. Total expenditures are projected to increase from 45.4% of GDP 
in 2010 to close to 50% in 2050, compared to 43.5% in last year's PEP. Total revenues are set to stay 
at 44.4% during this period, also somewhat higher than in last year's submission (41.7%). Spending on 
old-age pensions is also expected to decline from 9.2% of GDP in 2010 to 7% in 2050, as a larger 
share of pensions is expected to be paid by the second pillar. Pension contributions would stay at 
around 6.3% of GDP in 2050.  Health care spending is set to increase markedly from 7.4% in 2010 to 
13.7% of GDP in 2050, mainly as a result of an ageing population. Interestingly, despite an unchanged 
population trend, the projected share of health spending in GDP turns out to be higher compared to 
last year's PEP, by around 2 percentage points in 2010 and 3.5 percentage points in 2050. The 
document explains this also as a result of new health care measures adopted in late 2008. Those were 
primarily directed at tapping additional sources of financing, thus allowing for higher public health 
spending, rather than at structural changes to the system conducive to ensuring the long-term 
sustainability of the system.     
Like last year's submission, the programme does not foresee additional reforms in the area of pension, 
health care or labour markets which would improve the long term sustainability of public finance. The 
obvious challenges arising from demographic pressures remain significant, also in view of an already 
relatively high public debt ratio and a very low participation rate. Moreover, long-term sustainability 
could be further eroded, if growth and productivity trends turned out to be less comfortable and if 
participation rates fell below levels assumed under the programme. Given the risks and magnitude of 
challenges, the programme would have benefited from outlining a somewhat more thorough policy 
response to the challenges of an ageing society.  
1.5. STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
 
The PEP 2009-2011 covers a broad range of structural reforms related to the enterprise and financial 
sector, labour market, agricultural sector, public administration, education, health care, judiciary, and 
environment.  The presentation is often backward looking, providing information on past and ongoing 
reform initiatives with a strong emphasis on harmonisation with EU requirements. More emphasis 
could have been given to measures aimed at improving the business environment, given the pertaining 
administrative obstacles still in place. The programme contains fiscal estimates on some measures, but 
the link between the structural reform agenda and the implementation of the fiscal strategy could be 
further strengthened. The full implementation of the structural reform agenda would in some cases 
require the establishment of time bound action plans and the definition of concrete measures and clear 
targets. On such a basis, it would be conducive to meeting the objectives of the Lisbon agenda 
concerning product, labour and capital markets and the establishment of a knowledge based economy. 
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Intensified efforts to speed up the implementation of reforms, in particular in the areas of enterprise 
restructuring, education and labour markets would be supportive to the fulfilment of the second 
Copenhagen economic criteria over the medium term.    
1.5.1. Product and capital markets 
The PEP 2009-2011 touches upon the following main reform areas related to the functioning of 
product markets: strengthening of competition policy and state aid control, privatisation, enterprise 
restructuring (railway sector, shipbuilding) and SME development. Further progress has been 
achieved in the area of competition policy and state aid control. The PEP envisages a continuation of 
measures aimed at a strengthening of the legal and institutional framework and a further 
harmonisation with EU requirements, which is welcome. The process of privatisation of state assets 
held in the Privatisation Fund has made only very limited progress in the past. In September 2008, the 
fund's portfolio still comprised 890 companies, in 96 of which the state is a majority owner. The 
acceleration of privatisation remains a declared economic policy objective. However, the programme 
does not provide a time-bound plan for selling or liquidating state assets, with the exception of the 
privatisation of the six loss-making shipyards, scheduled to be completed by end-2009. Significant 
efforts are still required with respect to the restructuring of shipyards in order to fully comply with EU 
requirements and the programme should have put more emphasis on outlining the government's 
strategy in this respect. It also remains unclear why and in which way the ongoing or planned 
institutional reforms, notably the transformation of the Privatisation Fund as well as the creation of 
investment funds would improve the prospects for privatisation. The restructuring of the loss-making 
railway sector has made very limited progress and the railways continue to absorb high levels of 
budget support (above 1% of GDP). Low productivity and high unit labour costs continue to 
undermine their long-term viability, but wages and staff levels have nonetheless increased recently. 
Against this background, it is appropriate that railway restructuring remains an important policy 
priority, also with a view to ensuring the sector's viability and competitiveness once the full 
liberalisation of passenger and freight markets take place. The programme would however have 
benefited from providing specific restructuring objectives to be achieved beyond 2008, in terms of 
operating ratios and staff levels. As it stands now, the programme remains rather declarative. The 
SME sector is likely to continue to benefit from various incentive schemes at different government 
levels.  As further improvements in the overall business environment remain an important challenge, 
the programme should have also addressed measures to improve the regulatory framework and to 
address inefficiencies in public administration.  
The programme gives a thorough overview of recent and planned measures aimed to align the 
financial sector legislation and in particular prudential regulations with EU requirements. This process 
appears to be well on track. Moreover, the banking sector has become more resilient as a result of a 
number of specific supervisory measures that have been taken to address potential macro-financial 
vulnerabilities. Additional capital requirements were imposed on fast-growing banks, and risk weights 
on un-hedged foreign currency loans were increased. Banks' capital adequacy, asset quality and 
profitability have remained at comfortable levels. One would have expected the programme to discuss 
in more detail the new challenges for domestic financial and capital markets in the context of the 
global financial crisis and the possible policy responses to mitigate risks for financial sector stability.  
1.5.2. Labour market 
 
Despite a recent trend decline in unemployment levels and moderate employment growth, the 
Croatian labour market continues to suffer from unusually low participation and employment rates as 
well as high rates of youth and long-term unemployment. The policy response of the programme 
continues to focus on active labour market measures, including qualification of job seekers and 
temporary employment subsidies for vulnerable groups. However, relying exclusively on active 
labour market policies does not appear to be sufficient to address the core problems of the Croatian 
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labour market. A more comprehensive reform approach would need to address incentive structures on 
the labour supply and demand side. Significant labour supply disincentives appear to be linked to a 
number of factors, such as a low effective retirement age, built-in incentives for early retirement and 
generous social welfare benefits for parts of the population, particularly for war veterans. A stronger 
labour demand is likely hampered by rigid employment protection and collective wage bargaining 
systems. Overall, the programme does not address the structural deficiencies in a manner which would 
be conducive to increase the flexibility of the labour market.  On a more positive note, the new law on 
the restructuring of unemployment benefits, which leads to higher replacement rates in the first three 
months   followed by a gradual decrease thereafter, as well as the provision of financial incentives for 
unemployed to participate in educational measures are steps in the right direction to fight long-term 
unemployment.  
1.5.3. Other reform areas 
In the area of social security, the PEP 2009-2011 envisages to improve the financial situation of low 
income groups, pensioners, families, and students, on the basis of already adopted legislation. The 
establishment of a social benefit registry as well as a personal identification number are seen as 
important elements to render the social benefit system more effective, notably to reduce an 
"accumulation" of benefits. However, the PEP remains vague on the precise steps to be taken to 
further streamline the social benefit system. On the reform of health care financing, the PEP refers to a 
new health reform package adopted last December. It introduced new sources of financing, such as 
higher co-payments, higher contributions from some pensioners and unemployed persons, as well as 
new mandatory allocations from other revenue sources (32% of excises, 10% of paid car insurance 
premium). In particular, the reform seeks to stabilise the financing of hospitals through larger transfers 
from the health budget. However, a strategy whose primary focus is on strengthening the revenue base 
of the system without tackling its structural weaknesses may not be sufficient to ensure its long-term 
financial sustainability. This weakness is to some extent mitigated by the fact that the health reform 
contains some measures aimed at strengthening the role of primary health care as a gatekeeper to the 
system and improving the productivity of hospitals. With respect to the agricultural sector, the 
programme envisages the adoption of new state aid principles, and the overall state aid is projected to 
slightly decline as a percentage of GDP while the share of horizontal support in total aid will increase. 
Moreover, the privatisation of a large agricultural and food processing company is programmed for 
2009, but the PEP does not provide any revenue estimates. The continuation of education reform on 
the basis of an Educational System Development Plan (2005-2010) is welcome and should be 
supportive of the development of a knowledge-based economy. On agriculture, the PEP envisages a 
new State Aid Act. As part of the preparations for the Common Agricultural Policy, considerable 
changes are indeed needed to adjust the current largely production-based support system. As in the 
previous PEP, emphasis on judicial reform is appropriate and the successful implementation of 
envisaged measures could be conducive to improving the overall business environment, which 
remains an important challenge.  
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2008 2009 2010 2011
Enterprise restructuring and state aid -149.44 -14.23 -128.85 -115.93
Labour market reforms -58.59 -92.56 -25.29 -23.07
Agriculture sector reform -136.24 -2.80 28.51 21.85
Health reforms 0.00 -240.85 -281.25 -17.66
Other reforms -136.26 44.73 -24.88 -125.62
Total impact on the budget -480.53 -305.71 -431.78 -260.43
Total impact on the budget (% of GDP) -1.17 -0.70 -0.93 -0.52
Source: Pre-accession Economic Programme 2009-2011, own calculations
Table II.1.5:
Net direct budgetary impact of key reform commitments (in EUR million)
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General economic background
Real GDP 1 4.2 4.3 4.8 5.6 3.5 2.5 2.0 3.1 2.9 1.4
Labour productivity 2 64.8 61.6 63.8 71.7 71.4 100 100 100 100 100
Real unit labour cost 3 -3.2 7.5 -4.7 -8.7 -1.1 -1.4 -0.6 -1.1 -0.8 -1.6
Real effective exchange rate 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 101.2 107.5 106.4 107.9 114.0
Inflation rate 5 2.0 3.3 3.2 2.9 6.1 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.3 3.7
Unemployment rate 6 13.7 12.7 11.2 9.6 8.5 9.0 8.9 8.2 7.1 7.0
Employment
Employment rate 7 54.7 55.0 55.6 57.1 n.a. 63.0 63.6 64.5 65.4 n.a.
Employment rate - females 8 47.8 48.6 49.4 50.0 n.a. 55.5 56.3 57.3 58.3 n.a.
Employment rate of older workers 9 30.1 32.6 34.3 35.8 n.a. 40.7 42.3 43.5 44.7 n.a.
Long term unemployment 10 7.4 7.4 6.7 5.9 n.a. 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.0 n.a.
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 66.5 68.7 69.8 70.1 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 34.7 35.1 36.9 37.1 n.a. 9.0 9.8 10.7 10.7 n.a.
Net FDI  13 2.0 2.6 4.2 9.3 n.a. 0.9 1.7 2.2 3.4 n.a.
Market share electricity 14 86.0 87.0 83.0 84.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aid 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.6 0.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Business investment 16 29.1 29.0 30.8 30.0 n.a. 17.2 17.7 18.2 18.7 n.a.
Knowledge based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 5.4 5.7 6.0 n.a. n.a. 12.5 13.2 13.0 n.a. n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 4.5 4.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.1 5.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 93.5 93.8 94.6 95.3 n.a. 77.1 77.5 77.9 78.1 n.a.
R&D expenditure 20 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 n.a. 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 n.a.
Broadband penetration rate (EU25) 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.5 10.6 14.8 19.0 n.a.
Source:  Commission services, Croatia's Central Bureau of Statistics
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Labour productivity per person employed - GDP in PPS per person employed relative to EU-25 (EU-
25=100).  3. Growth rate of the ratio: compensation per employee in current prices divided by GDP (in current prices) per total employment.  
4. Vs IC36 (1995 = 100), current year's values are based on Commission's forecast deflator figures, nominal unit labour cost deflator.  5. 
Annual average rate of change in Interim Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs), Croatia = CPI.     6. Unemployed persons as a 
share of the total active population.  7. Employed persons aged 15-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  8. Employed women 
aged 15-64 in % of total female population of the same age group.  9. Employed persons aged 55-64 (EU25) or 50-64 (Croatia) in % of total 
population of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active population aged 15-64.   11. comparative 
price levels of final consumption by private households including indirect taxes (EU-25=100).  12. Trade integration - Average value of 
imports and exports of goods divided by GDP.  13. Average value of inward and outward FDIs flows in % of GDP.  14. Market share
of the largest generator (% of total net generation).  15. In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private
sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary graduates in science and technology per 1000 of population aged 20-29.  
18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP.  19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed 
at least upper secondary education. 20. GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP. 21. Percentage 
of households who have Broadband access at home.
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value, q: estimated from quarterly values.
Table II.1.6:
Annex: Structural indicators
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2.1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
The Pre-Accession Economic Programme for 2009 - 2011 (the "2009 PEP") of the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia is a comprehensive economic policy document, which is however based on a 
rather optimistic economic scenario. The fiscal strategy appears very ambitious and is in line with the 
budget for 2009 and the country's fiscal strategy for the period 2009-2011. The description of 
structural reforms is rather broad but lacks a discussion of policy priorities and the link to the EU 
accession process. Concerning content, form and data, the programme partly complies with the 
requested standard.   
The recent economic performance has been characterised by strong growth during 2007 and the first 
half of 2008, but started to decelerate in the second half of the year. The current account deficit rose 
significantly, while the fiscal balance turned from a slight surplus in 2007 into a deficit of about 1½% 
of GDP in 2008. The reduction in the public debt ratio came to a halt. Inflationary pressures subsided 
towards the end of the year.  
The programme is based on strong economic growth of 5½% to 7% during 2009-2011, which even at 
the time of submission at the end of January was optimistic in view of the ongoing sharp deterioration 
in the international environment.  In the meantime, this scenario has become increasingly unrealistic. 
The programme's expectations concerning inflation are more in line with the country's track record. 
However, public finances are planned to register deficits of close to 3%, mainly through higher capital 
investment in order to raise the country's growth potential.  The presentation suffers from a lack of 
reliable and consistent statistical data, impeding the analysis of the country's position in the business 
cycle and of the assessment of reform measures. Furthermore, the provided data in the main body of 
the document are not always consistent with information provided in the data annex. Overall, the 
macroeconomic scenario appears to be too optimistic to serve as a realistic planning tool. In addition, 
the programme would have benefitted from a more extensive analysis of the substantial downward 
risks, already very present at the time of submission. 
The fiscal performance during the last year was characterised by a significant fiscal surplus during 
most of the year (some 2% of GDP by October 2008), which during the last 2 months of 2008 turned 
into a central government deficit of about 1% of GDP. The main reason for the surpluses was stronger 
than expected tax revenues, while public capital spending remained below targets. In the last two 
months of 2008, revenues were below expectations, while spending for capital investment and in 
particular for transfers rose sharply.  
The programme's fiscal framework for 2009-2011 is geared towards fostering economic growth 
through a more active fiscal policy, by lowering the tax burden while increasing public spending, in 
particular with respect to capital investment. In 2009, the deficit is expected to increase from 1.5% of 
GDP in 2008 to 2.8% of GDP, mainly as a result of decline in total revenues by nearly 2 percentage 
points of GDP. In 2010 and 2011, both revenue and expenditure are estimated to continue declining as 
a share of GDP, reflecting the impact of the crisis on revenues and a reduction of public spending. 
However, public revenues estimates appear to be poorly linked to the macroeconomic framework, 
while the presentation of expenditure reducing measures is very parsimonious. The main strategy 
seems to be to increase spending at a lower rate than nominal GDP, while only public consumption is 
planned to be reduced in absolute terms. However, there is only vague information on how this 
spending reduction will be achieved. In general, the PEP would have benefitted from more 
clarifications on contingency plans and priorities and on ways to increase revenues or to reduce 
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spending, given the risk of a decelerating revenue performance, the shallow domestic credit markets 
which impede to raise funds domestically and the increasing difficulties in financing the planned 
deficits on international markets. Furthermore, more information on measures to improve the quality 
of public finances would have been welcome.  
The country's structural reform programme aims to support the establishment of a functioning market 
economy, particularly by improving the business climate and strengthening the competitiveness of the 
country's enterprises. However, the connection between the reform measures and the government 
priorities are not sufficiently spelled out and the link to accession related priorities is rather weak.  
Overall, the programme's reform agenda is broadly consistent with the fiscal scenario. However, the 
programme would have benefited from a closer alignment with the reform requirements in view of the 
country's EU accession perspectives, for example as spelled out in the latest Progress Report and the 
European Partnership.  Furthermore, the programme does not yet sufficiently take into account the 
economic and fiscal impact of the global crisis on the country's economy It would also have gained 
from devoting more attention to key challenges to the economy, such as the very ill-performing labour 
market.  
2.2. INTRODUCTION 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia submitted its third PEP on 30th January 2009, covering 
the period 2008-2011. The programme has been adopted by the government. It is a joint document 
with contributions of a large number of line ministries and the Central Bank, under the coordination of 
the Ministry of Finance. Social Partners were not included in the drafting of the document. The 
programme is a new document and takes into account the 2009 budget and other national 
programmes, such as the National Development Plan, the fiscal strategy for 2007-2009 and the 
National Plan for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). However, the link to the country's accession 
process, such as the European Partnership priorities and the Commission's assessment in the Progress 
Report is weak.  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Real GDP growth (% change) COM 5.9 5.5 4.6 5.0 n. a.
PEP 2009 5.9 6.0 5.5 6.0 7.0
Consumer price inflation (%) COM 2.3 7.0 3.5 2.7 n. a.
PEP 2009 2.3 8.3 3.5 2.8 2.8
General government balance (% of GDP) COM -0.8 -1.0 -2.7 -2.4 n. a.
Table II.2.1:
Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
PEP 2009 0.7 -1.5 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8
Primary balance (% of GDP) COM 0.2 0.0 -1.9 -1.7 n. a.
PEP 2009 1.5 -0.7 -2.0 -1.9 -1.8
Government gross debt (% of GDP) COM 24.7 23.2 23.0 22.8 n. a.
PEP 2009 21.7 18.7 20.8 22.7 23.5
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), Commission autumn 2008 forecast  
The document partly complies with the content, form and data required for this exercise, as specified 
in the outline. It contains a general overview of recent economic developments and presents a 
parsimonious macroeconomic framework.  The document describes key medium-term fiscal and other 
policy objectives and provides an overall presentation of structural reforms of product and capital 
markets in the light of EU-integration.  Concerning the form, the 2009 PEP follows the structure of 
the outline and represents a stand-alone document, providing required information on the 
macroeconomic and fiscal framework and on structural reforms. The document also includes the 
quantitative information required. However, the completeness and consistency of the provided data 
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leaves significant room for improvement. Furthermore, a significant share of the data, in particular the 
fiscal data, is not yet in line with ESA 95 requirements. The programme also presents several 
alternative scenarios and briefly analyses their fiscal impact.  
2.3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES  
2.3.1. Recent macroeconomic developments  
After years of subdued growth, economic activity has been relatively strong in 2007, reaching real 
GDP growth of about 6% and decelerated during 2008, reaching output growth of 5% in 2008. The 
acceleration in economic activity in 2007 and early 2008 was mainly based on stronger domestic 
demand, in particular private consumption and investment. The labour market situation continued to 
improve marginally, with a decline in unemployment from 34.7% end of 2007 to 33.5% at the end of 
2008. Employment rose by some 2½% during 2008. However, youth unemployment, which accounts 
for some 20% of the unemployed, stayed at 56% of the labour force in this age group. Consumer price 
inflation started to decelerate by mid-2008, after higher food and energy prices had brought inflation 
close to 10% in the first half of 2008. By the end of the year, 12-month inflation had come down to 
4.1%, resulting in an annual inflation rate of 8.3% for 2008.  
The current account started to deteriorate by the end of 2007, reaching a deficit of 7% of GDP over 
2007 and of 12% of GDP by December 2008. The main factors for this strong increase in imports 
were higher expenditures for energy and machinery. FDI rose sharply during the last year, reaching 
nearly 7% of GDP by end -2008. A considerable part of these capital inflows was related to 
investment of foreign banks in private local banks. In the last two months of 2008, the economic 
performance deteriorated markedly as the impact of lower external demand feeding through to the 
domestic economy. . 
Overall, the programme presents a clear and concise picture of past economic developments and 
covers all relevant data available at the time of submission.  
2.3.2. Key policy challenges  
The economic developments during the last months of 2008 point to a number of important policy 
challenges: mitigating the impact of the global financial crisis and maintaining the sustainability of the 
country's external balances while using the fiscal space in an efficient and prudent way. Addressing 
the very high unemployment in general, and among the young in particular, remains another important 
medium-term issue.  
With respect to the country's accession perspective, important challenges are to improve its 
administrative capacities, to strengthen regulatory and supervisory agencies and to improve the rule of 
law and contract enforcement.  
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 Box II.2.1: The global financial crisis: first impact and policy response.
Due to the low degree of internationalisation of the country's financial sector and the relatively small size
of this sector, the immediate direct impact of the global financial crisis has remained limited so far.
During January 2009, the stock market index has further declined, albeit at a slower pace, bringing the
stock market capitalisation to below 35% of GDP. In the last months of 2008 and in early 2009, foreign
exchange reserves dropped, partly as a result of a one-off dividend payment to a foreign investor, but also
because of increased foreign exchange purchases of households and enterprises, possibly reflecting
declining confidence in the stability of the national currency. The Central Bank intervened in order to
keep the exchange rate stable. However, this situation seems to have stabilised during February.  
In November 2008, the authorities presented ten measures to alleviate the impact of the global crisis, 
claiming an effect of 5-6% of GDP. However, the majority of those measures (some 3-4% of GDP) 
appear to have no impact on the deficit, as they consist of rebates and write-offs of unpaid social security 
contributions, which the authorities had not included in their 2009 revenue estimates. The remaining part 
(about 2% of GDP) consists mainly of a further lowering of taxes on profits and agricultural incomes. 
Those measures, however, have not been included in the 2009 budget, due to the already advanced stage 
of the budgetary discussions in parliament. The authorities intend to finance this package through 
international loans and a Eurobond issue.  
 
 
 
2.3.3. Medium-term macroeconomic scenario  
The programme presents an – in principle – coherent macroeconomic framework, albeit based on 
assumptions which at the time of submission were already very optimistic and which have become 
increasingly unlikely in the meantime.  However, in contrast to last years' submission, the programme 
includes several alternative scenarios, including a significant reduction in economic growth, a much 
lower than expected revenue performance and a one-off expenditure shock of 2 % of GDP. Given the 
current situation, the low growth scenario appears more appropriate, assuming a drop in GDP growth 
to half of the baseline scenario.  
Compared to last year, the programme expects GDP growth to be 1 percentage point lower, while 
inflation is 1 percentage point higher than assumed last year. The main justification for this revision is 
the impact of the global financial crisis.  
The overall thrust of the programme is much in line with last year’s submission.  Compared to the 
Commission’s autumn forecast, the PEP continues to be significantly more optimistic with respect to 
economic growth and employment growth, while being more downbeat with respect to the 
unemployment rate and the current account deficit.  
Real sector 
The macroeconomic scenario assumes a rather moderate slowdown in economic activity, with real 
GDP growth decelerating from 6% in 2007 to 5.5% in 2009, while accelerating to 6% and 7% in the 
following two years.  The main driving forces for this favourable development are private 
consumption, supported by high employment growth and strong investment, benefitting from an 
improved business environment which is expected to boost domestic and foreign investment. On the 
supply side, the service sector will be the main contributor to growth.  The authorities expect the 
country's de facto fixed exchange rate regime to keep inflationary pressures close to EU levels, with 
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consumer price inflation coming down to 2.8% in 2010 and 2011. Given that the external environment 
had already deteriorated further at the time of submission, the programme probably was already then 
based on too optimistic assumptions for serving as a realistic tool for policy planning.  
The general government deficit is expected to deteriorate from close to balance in the past to 1% of 
GDP in 2008 and 2.8% during 2009-2011.  The level of public debt is seen to continue declining.  
Early debt repayments during 2007 brought down the debt ratio to about 25% of GDP by the end of 
2007.  In 2008, the debt ratio declined further to 21% of GDP. However, higher deficits will lead to an 
increase in the debt ratio during the remaining programme period. The current account deficit is 
expected to deteriorate to about 11% of GDP in 2009 and to improve marginally in 2010 and 2011 to 
around 10% of GDP. Substantial inflows of FDI are expected to support the financing of imports.  
Overall, the programme's growth projections appear to have been calculated before the sharp 
deterioration in the global economic outlook.  
The programme presents the fiscal impact of three alternative scenarios. One scenario assumes growth 
to drop to half of the baseline scenario; the other assumes revenues to increase by only ¼ of the 
programme rates and the third one calculates the impact of a one-off increase in spending by 2 
percentage points. In all three scenarios, the deficit increases by about 1 percentage point in 2009. 
However, in case of the lower growth scenario, the fiscal imbalance increases by another ½ 
percentage point in 2010, to 4½ % of GDP, but improves by 1 percentage point in 2011, reaching a 
deficit of 3½ % of GDP. In the case of the revenue-shortfall scenario and the expenditure shock 
scenario the fiscal deterioration continues. Given the current global slowdown, the first scenario 
appears to be more likely, expecting GDP growth of some 2¾% in 2009 and an acceleration to 3% 
and 3½% in 2010 and 2011. In that case, the fiscal deficit would be close to 4% of GDP in 2009, 
increase to 4½% in 2010, but improve to 3½% of GDP in 2011. However, it would have been 
interesting to look also at a combination of shocks, such as lower growth and lower revenue growth. 
In view of the substantial downward risks at the time of submission, the programme would have 
benefitted from a more detailed discussion of those alternative scenarios, included in the document for 
the first time. 
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) 5.9 5.9 5.5 6.0 4.6 5.5 5.0 6.0 n.a. 7.0
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand 6.8 6.8 13.1 6.1 5.5 5.4 6.4 4.5 n.a. 4.8
- Change in inventories 1.2 1.2 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 n.a. 0.5
- External balance of goods and services -4.1 -4.1 -7.6 -3.0 -0.8 -2.5 -1.3 -0.9 n.a. -1.2
Employment (% change) 4.0 4.0 3.3 4.0 3.2 4.0 3.5 4.0 n.a. 4.0
Unemployment rate (%) 34.9 34.9 33.3 33.7 32.3 33.5 31.0 33.0 n.a. 32.4
GDP deflator (% change) 7.4 7.4 4.1 8.0 4.1 3.5 2.9 2.8 n.a. 2.8
CPI inflation (%) 2.3 2.3 7.0 8.3 3.5 3.5 2.7 2.8 n.a. 2.8
Current account balance (% of GDP) -7.2 -7.2 -12.1 -11.3 -10.0 -11.1 -8.4 -10.2 n.a. -10.1
Table II.2.2:
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP); Commission Autumn 2008 forecasts (COM)
 
Inflation  
After a sharp rise in inflation in 2008, declining energy prices and lower external and domestic 
demand are expected to result in lower inflation, reaching some 3.5% in 2009 and 2.8% in 2010 and 
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2011. However, this outlook appears rather benign, taking into account relatively high nominal wage 
growth in 2008 and the expectation of GDP growth above potential. 
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
The monetary framework continues to consider price stability as the overarching monetary policy 
objective.  To this end, the central bank maintains a de-facto fixed peg of the denar towards the euro. 
In view of the high share of euro-denominated imports (some 60% of total imports) this helps to 
contain price pressures through imports.  As a result of the recent strength of the euro, the nominal 
effective exchange rate slightly appreciated during the last years. No changes to the current exchange 
rate regime are envisaged.  The central bank has continued to upgrade the institution’s analytical and 
forward-looking capacities.  Overall, the monetary framework is in line with the programme's supply 
side approach to stimulate economic growth by improving the business environment and reducing the 
tax burden.  
External sector 
The programme expects a deceleration of global demand, which will lead to a deceleration of export 
growth. FDI inflows are expected to remain on a much higher level than in the past, benefitting from 
improved attractiveness to foreign investors. However, in view of the current sharp deterioration in 
international environment, those FDI assumptions appear too optimistic. Private transfers in the form 
of workers remittances and cash exchanges at foreign exchange offices are expected to remain on their 
relatively high level. Here too, the expectation of rather stable private transfers appears rather 
optimistic, given weak economic developments in the host countries of migrant workers, such as 
Germany.  
The 2009 PEP expects a marked widening of the current account deficit from 7% of GDP in 2007 to 
11% of GDP in 2009, mainly as a result of a decrease of export growth to less exceptional levels. In 
the following 2 years, decelerating import growth should contribute to stabilise the current account 
deficit at some 10% of GDP. The main driving force behind the sharp deterioration is the increase in 
the trade deficit in 2008, which however is expected to decline from 26.7% of GDP in 2008 to 24.6% 
in 2011. Furthermore, current transfers are predicted to decline, from 16% in 2008 to 14.8% in 2011.  
Concerning the financial account, FDI inflows are expected to continue to play an important role. 
However, in percent of GDP, a moderate decline is foreseen, with a decline from 8.1% of GDP in 
2008 to 7.5% in 2011. This is about twice the level of FDI inflows registered during recent years.  
Foreign exchange reserves increased by 0.8% of GDP in 2008.  However, in the remaining 
programme period, foreign exchange reserves are seen to decline, by about 2% of GDP in 2009 and 
some 5.4% and 5.1% in 2010 and 2011, respectively.   
In view of the programme’s macroeconomic profile of accelerating growth, the expected improvement 
in the trade account would have deserved a more detailed explanation. In particular, the relatively 
slow growth of imports appears difficult to reconcile with the expected central role of import-intensive 
investment for economic growth in the programme period. With respect to sector balances, the 
programme envisages increased net lending of the households and corporate private sector, financing 
the deficits of the public sector and the current account deficit. Compared to last year’s submission, 
the authorities expect significantly higher public sector and external deficits. However, the programme 
is rather short on plans as how to finance those deficits.  
Overall, the chapter on external developments would have benefitted from explaining in greater 
details the main factors underpinning the authorities’ external outlook. The framework is subject to 
substantial risks, in particular with respect to its assumptions on capital inflows in form of FDI and 
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private transfers. Furthermore, the expected export growth appears to be on the optimistic side, 
especially given the current rapid deterioration in global demand. 
2.4. PUBLIC FINANCE  
The fiscal framework refers to the overall policy objective of fostering economic growth by lowering 
the tax burden and of supporting investment by improving the business environment and lowering 
profit taxation. However, overall, the link to the macroeconomic framework and accession related 
requirements is rather weak. The framework itself appears to be largely coherent, albeit with a strong 
focus on describing past developments, while being very short and too general when discussing the 
forward looking part of the programming period. Compliance with ESA 95 seems to be rather weak 
and unfortunately the programme does not specify a concrete timeframe for aligning the data 
presentation with ESA 95. Furthermore, the data deviate from data presented in the fiscal notification 
without specifying the reasons for the deviation.  
Change:
2008-11
Revenues 35.6 40.7 38.9 34.8 32.2 -8.5
- Taxes and social security contributions 30.2 31.8 30.6 26.9 25.6 -6.2
    - Other (residual) 5.4 8.9 8.3 7.9 6.6 -2.3
Expenditure 34.9 42.2 41.7 37.6 35.0 -7.2
- Primary expenditure 34.1 41.4 40.9 36.7 34.0 -7.4
of which:
Gross fixed capital formation 4.1 5.7 8.0 7.7 7.2 1.5
Consumption 11.4 14.8 15.6 13.2 11.9 -2.9
Transfers & subsidies 18.6 17.3 17.3 15.7 15.0 -2.3
Other (residual) 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -3.7
- Interest payments 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.2
Budget balance 0.7 -1.5 -2.8 -2.8 -2.8 -1.3
- Cyclically adjusted -1.2 -2.5 -2.7 -3.0 n.a. -0.5
Table II.2.3:
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (% of GDP)
Primary balance 1.5 -0.7 -2.0 -1.9 -1.8 -1.1
Gross debt level 21.7 18.7 20.8 22.7 23.5 4.8
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations  
The programme is very parsimonious when it comes to quantifying the various planned revenue and 
expenditure measures. The programme expects the economy to grow above potential in 2010 and 
2011, which brings the cyclically adjusted deficit to 4.5% of GDP in 2011. In this context, the 
country’s fiscal policy appears to be rather pro-cyclical in 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, the planned 
deficits lead to an increase in the debt ratio, which deteriorates the country’s so far favourable 
situation with respect to public debt.  
Assessing the fiscal strategy is also impeded by data inconsistencies, both between the descriptive part 
and the annex tables but also within the annex tables. The main element of the fiscal strategy seems to 
be a sharp increase in capital expenditure in 2009, while in 2010 and 2011 lower spending for public 
consumption and social transfers should compensate for the expected decline in revenues (from 39% 
of GDP in 2009 to 30.6% in 2010). The main source for financing the increased deficits will be 
foreign loans, increasing from 1.7% of GDP in 2009 to 3.4% of GDP in 2011. As a result, the debt 
ratio is expected to increase by some 4½ percentage points of GDP, from 21.4% of GDP in 2008 to 
25.8% in 2011, a still rather moderate level.  
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2.4.1. Budget implementation in 2008  
Central government accounts registered significant surpluses during most of 2008, which however 
turned into a deficit of close to 1 % of GDP at the end of year. The main reasons for this deterioration 
were declining revenues and a sharp increase in spending during the last 2 months of the year. In June 
and October, the parliament adopted supplementary budgets, envisaging additional expenditures 
amounting to some 2½% of GDP.  The additional funds were supposed to be used to cover losses of 
the state-owned electricity generation, for additional social and labour market related measures and for 
construction and renovation. The public sector debt ratio1 declined from 39% of GDP at the end of 
2006 to some 22% at the end 2008.  This drop was mainly due to early debt repayments.  
The end-year fiscal deficit of 1.5% of GDP was close to the fiscal target. However, during most of 
2008, public sector accounts registered significant surpluses, which turned into a deficit only in the 
last few months of the year. This profile points to significant administrative weaknesses in both, 
revenue estimation but also expenditure implementation. A considerable part of the additional 
spending at the end of the year was not planned investment, but transfers in the form of subsidies. As 
a result, the quality and focus of public spending appears not to be very high. Revenue collection 
benefitted not only from higher inflation, but also improved tax collection as a result of institutional 
reforms of tax collection.  
2.4.2. Near-term and medium-term budget strategy  
The programme envisages a general government deficit of 2.8% of GDP in 2009, which is in line with 
the 2009 budget for the central government, adopted in December 2008. Total general government 
revenues are expected to decline from 40.7% of GDP in 2008 to 39%, while total expenditures are 
planned to decline from 42.2% of GDP in 2008 to 41.7% in 2009.  
                                                          
 
1  The authorities' concept of general government is based on GFS 1981, which is fully in line with ESA 95. For example, 
debt of state enterprises is not included in the debt concept of the authorities' general government. The concept of public 
debt thus appears to be a better approximation to the concept of general government according to ESA 95. 
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In the descriptive part of the programme, the authorities refer to a decline in total revenues, from 
40.7% of GDP in 2008 to 39.0% of GDP in 2009, resulting from measures to reduce the tax burden on 
profits and income and to lower social contributions. Unfortunately, the programme only indicates 
that profit taxes, VAT and social security contributions will be the main factors for this decline, but 
does not quantify the impact of those various revenue categories. No major privatisation revenues are 
mentioned. With respect to expenditures, the programme seems to envisage a marked increase in 
capital spending by 2.3 percentage points of GDP. Another important additional spending category is 
public consumption, increasing by 0.8 percentage points of GDP.  
In the past, the country had a track record of prudent fiscal policies, underestimating tax revenues and 
budgeting optimistic spending targets. However, the authorities have repeatedly announced their 
intention to move to a more active fiscal policy. The assumptions on tax revenues appear to be 
significantly more optimistic than in the past. Furthermore, the 2009 budget does not yet contain the 
fiscal impact of a first anti-crisis package, which could reduce revenues by another 2% of GDP. As a 
result, revenue estimates appear far too optimistic. The envisaged sharp increase in capital spending in 
2009 is rather unprecedented while the reduction in public consumption in 2010 and 2011 is rather 
ambitious. More background information on these core expenditure measures would have been 
helpful.  
The programme envisages for 2010 and 2011 a significant drop in revenues by 6.7% of GDP, from 
39% of GDP in 2009 to 32.3% in 2011). This decline is partly explained by the government policy to 
reduce the tax burden and to lower social security contributions. However, another important 
contribution to the revenue decline probably reflects the impact of the crisis on the domestic economy. 
The main expenditure side measures to balance this revenue loss seem to be reductions in public 
consumption (by 3.7% of GDP in 2010 and 2011), and social transfers (by 2.3% of GDP in 2010 and 
2011). As a result, expenditures are planned to drop by 6.6% of GDP, from 41.7% of GDP in 2010 to 
35.1% in 2011. While in general the strategy for lowering the share of public spending seems to be to 
increase spending at a lower rate than nominal GDP growth, public consumption is envisaged to 
decline in absolute terms. Unfortunately the programme does not provide details as to how the 
authorities intend to lower public consumption, while at the same time embarking on a strategy of 
raising salaries in the public sector.  
Regrettably the programme limited its analysis of fiscal risks to the general sensitivity analysis in the 
macroeconomic framework. Undoubtedly, the programme would have benefitted from a more 
extended risk analysis, also covering risks of additional spending, for example related to the notorious 
financial needs of the state owned electricity producer, the probably increased financial needs of the 
health and pension insurance sector in view of the costs of the social security reform; and the risk of 
decelerating employment as a result of the crisis.  
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Gross debt ratio [1] 21.7 18.7 20.8 22.7 23.5
Change in the ratio -5.0 -3.0 2.1 1.9 0.8
Contributions [2]:
1. Primary balance -0.3 -0.2 0.6 0.5 -0.1
2. “Snow-ball” effect -2.0 -1.0 0.7 0.6 0.9
Of which:
Interest expenditure 1.1 1.7 2.2 2.3 2
Growth effect -1.4 -1.1 -0.9 -1.1 -1.4
Inflation effect -1.7 -1.5 -0.6 -0.5 -0.6
3. Stock-flow -2.5 -1.8 0.9 0.8 0.0
Notes:
.9
[1]   End of period.
[2]  The snow-ball effect captures the impact of interest expenditure on accumulated debt, as 
well as the impact of real GDP growth and inflation on the debt ratio (through the denominator). 
The stock-flow adjustment includes differences in cash and accrual accounting, accumulation of 
financial assets and valuation and other residual effects. 
Source: Pre-Accession Economic Programme(PEP); Commission services’ calculations
Table II.2.4:
Composition of changes in the debt ratio (% of GDP)
 
 
Structural balance (cyclical component of deficit, one-off measures and temporary measures, 
fiscal stance) 
With the exception of 2009, the programme expects the economy to grow above potential. The 
potential growth rate is estimated to increase from 5% in 2007 to 6.6% in 2011, which appears to be 
on the optimistic side. Over the same period, real GDP growth is seen to increase from 5.9% in 2007 
to 7% in 2011. Given the fiscal expansion during the programme period, the fact of above potential 
growth led to an even higher cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit, reaching some 4.5% of GDP in 2010. 
As a result, the fiscal stance can be seen as being pro-cyclical over the end of the programme period, 
which would warrant a less expansionary approach.  
Debt levels and developments, analysis of below-the-line operations and stock-flow 
adjustments 
According to the submitted data, the current level of total public debt was 34.4% of GDP at the end of 
2007 and dropped further to 28.2% at the end of 2008.1  The main factors for the decline have been 
early debt repayments, but also primary surpluses. During the programme period, the debt ratio is 
expected to increase to 34.7% of GDP, reflecting increased budgetary and extra-budgetary spending 
for infrastructure, education and electricity generation. The majority of this spending is planned to be 
financed through external sources, which would bring the external public debt from around 57% of 
total public debt (16% of GDP) in late 2008 to about 87% of public debt (30% of GDP). Unless large 
amounts can be borrowed from international financial institutions (IFIs) this may turn out to be 
optimistic assumptions given the current financial markets unfavourable situation.  
                                                          
 
1  Table 4 in the annex provides data on the consolidated general government sector, as submitted in the PEP. However, this 
aggregate is not in line with the ESA 95 concept and does not to include debt of public enterprises, amounting to about 
10% of GDP. The present assessment therefore uses data on public debt, which seems to be more in line with ESA 95. 
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In order to improve debt management, the Ministry of Finance established a central public debt 
management department in 2005 and adopted a medium-term public debt strategy, currently covering 
the years 2008-2010. This debt strategy envisages a limit to the increase in public debt ratio to 40% of 
GDP. 
About 77% of the total public debt is denominated in foreign currency, with a dominant share of the 
euro of about 55%. The interest rate structure is characterised by 54% of the debt with fixed interest 
rates and 46% with floating rates. The average maturity of external public debt is relatively long 
(about 8½ years), which is related to the high share of IFIs in the debt portfolio. Domestic debt has an 
average maturity of some 2¼ years only. Debt servicing costs are expected to remain at around 1% of 
GDP by 2011. Despite the relatively sound debt situation, the programme’s intention to substantially 
increase foreign denominated public debt increases the country’s exposure to exchange rate risks.  
2.4.3. Budgetary implications of "major structural reforms" 
The PEP provides a broad and comprehensive overview of the country's structural reform agenda.  
The document contains a detailed and comprehensive matrix of policy commitments, with quantitative 
information on the impact of various reform measures on budgetary expenditures and revenues.  The 
presentation also contains information on the time schedule of the various measures.  However, as in 
the last submission, the presentation would have benefited from a more explicit description of the 
government's policy priorities and the policy mix which results from its priorities.  The policy mix 
contains measures which are in line with the Lisbon agenda and the priorities derived from the 
Commission's Progress Report and spelled out as economic priorities in the European Partnership.  
However, when looking at the fiscal commitments, the policy mix is highly focused on a few areas, 
such as strengthening infrastructure, supporting the agricultural sector and education, while the 
financial commitments related to other policy objectives, such as direct measures to address the labour 
market imbalances and improving the efficiency of public administration, are still very limited.  The 
overall estimated level of reform oriented spending has been increased significantly compared to last 
year’s submission, to around 4½% of GDP during the programme period.  
Overall, the main structural reforms should have an important impact on the country's fiscal position, 
with a net effect of around 5% of GDP.  The measures related to infrastructure and education address 
important structural weaknesses and are therefore likely to add to the country's growth potential.  
2.4.4. Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous PEP  
In contrast to last year's submission, the programme presents an analysis of the impact of various 
alternative scenarios on the budget deficit. The first assumes real GDP to grow only at half of the 
baseline rate, a second scenario looks at the implications of revenue growth of only ¼ of the baseline 
scenario and the third scenario assesses a one-off expenditure shock of 2% of GDP. In all three cases, 
the initial impact on the fiscal deficit is about 1% of GDP. In the low growth scenario the deficit 
deteriorates by another ½ percentage point of GDP further in 2010, to 4½% of GDP, but improves by 
1 percentage point in 2011, reaching a deficit of 3½% of GDP. In the case of the revenue-shortfall 
scenario and the expenditure shock scenario the fiscal deterioration continues. Given the current 
global slowdown, the first scenario appears to be more likely, expecting GDP growth to slow down to 
some 2¾% in 2009 and an acceleration to 3% and 3½% in 2010 and 2011. In that case, the deficit 
would be close to 4% of GDP in 2009, increase to 4½% in 2010, but improve to 3 % of GDP in 2011. 
Although this impact appears to be rather modest, the programme does not present any contingency 
measures for the case of fiscal slippage. However, the document provides information on the size of 
contingent liabilities, which appear to be rather low with respect to GDP.  
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2.4.5. Quality of public finances and institutional features  
The country embarked in May 2000 on a major reform of public administration, which – with support 
from the IFIs – intended to reduce the public sector to its core activities and to improve the 
transparency and efficiency of public administration in general. Another impulse for public sector 
reform is based on the Ohrid framework agreement from 2001. In line with this agreement, the 
authorities endorsed a major programme of administrative decentralisation, which envisages 
transferring the competence and the financial means in a number of communal areas (such as 
education, health, local cultural institutions, urban planning and construction, fire brigades, etc.) to the 
local communities. So far, mainly the responsibilities have been transferred, while financial 
competences are more gradually transferred.  Overall, the institutional and legal changes over the last 
years appear to lead to a strengthening of the country's capacities to administrate public finances.  
The government's implementation of a flat tax on corporate profits and income will have an important 
impact on the level and composition of public revenues.  The lowering of direct taxes might help to 
stimulate consumption and investment.  But at the same time, it might shift the tax burden to lower 
income households.  During 2008, the authorities have started to reduce the tax wedge on labour, 
which should increase the incentives for official employment. Furthermore, the authorities have 
started to implement a switch to a gross salary concept, which should improve the transparency of 
social security system.   
2.4.6. Sustainability of public finances  
The programme contains a table with long-term (2000-2050) estimates on the sustainability of public 
finances. Based on an economic scenario with a decelerating trend in growth (from 6.5% in 2010 to 
4.5% in 2050) and a rather moderate decline in unemployment (from 37% in 2005 to 12% by 2050), 
the programme expects revenues and expenditures to remain constant as share in GDP, at 33% and 
32%, respectively. However, in contrast to last year's submission, expenditures for pensions are 
expected to increase relative to GDP, from 5.3% in 2005 to 7.5% of GDP in 2050. Health 
expenditures are also set to relatively decline, from 5.5% of GDP in 2005 to 4 in 2050. Spending for 
education is seen to increase, from 4.7% of GDP in 2005 to 6.4% in 2050.  
Overall, there appear to be no major and immediate threats to the long-term sustainability of the 
country's public finances, in particular in view of the country's relatively low debt level. Demographic 
pressures seem to pose no major threats, although a continued reform of the social security system 
appears to be necessary to keep public sector health spending under control. Provided that the current 
public sector reform agenda is fully implemented, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia seems 
to be relatively well placed to meet the costs of an aging population.  Nevertheless, costs in relation to 
the reform of the pension and health-care systems should be monitored carefully. 
2.5. STRUCTURAL REFORMS  
The 2009 PEP provides a broad and comprehensive overview of the country's structural reform 
agenda. The document also contains a detailed and comprehensive matrix of policy commitments, 
with quantitative information on the impact of the various reform measures on budgetary expenditures 
and revenues. The presentation also includes information on the time schedule of the various 
measures.  However, as last year, the presentation would have benefited from a more explicit 
discussion of the government's policy priorities and the policy mix which results from its priorities. 
The policy mix contains measures, which are in line with the Lisbon agenda and the priorities derived 
from the Commission's Progress Report and spelled out as economic priorities in the European 
Partnership.  
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However, in contrast to last year's submission, the level of fiscal commitments for structural reforms 
has been more than doubled, to some 4½% of GDP during the programme period. According to 
spending plans, the main emphasis of structural reforms seems to be on road construction, education 
and agriculture. However, investment in road and railway infrastructure usually is not considered to be 
a structural reform in the strict sense which would reduce the country's spending volume for structural 
reforms by about one third. Surprisingly, spending for active labour market policies is rather low, 
especially when taking into account the current unemployment level of some 33% of the labour force.  
 
2009 2010 2011
Road infrastructure -93.8 -106.4 -125.0
Education -91.4 -93.8 -94.6
Agriculture and rural sector -37.5 -40.8 -45.7
Railway infrastructure and introduction of system for -14.9 -14.7 -14.9
Business environment -12.6 -11.5 -12.7
Electronic communication -12.2 -12.2 -12.2
Other reforms (public administration, knowledge-based 
society, judiciary, envrionment, public procurement etc)
-72.6 -67.9 -111.7
Total impact on the budget -335.1 -347.3 -416.8
Total impact on the budget (in % of GDP) -4.6 -4.4 -4.8
Source: 2009 Pre-accession Economic Programme (PEP), own calculations
Table II.2.5:
Net direct budgetary impact of key reform commitments (in EUR million)
 
2.5.1. Product and capital markets  
Like the previous submission, the 2009 PEP contains a long and comprehensive description of a large 
number of structural reform areas targeted to improve the efficiency of product and capital markets.  
The main reform areas mentioned in the document are supporting the agricultural sector, 
strengthening infrastructure, strengthening the competitiveness of the industrial sector, strengthening 
competition policy and state aid control, promoting industrial clusters, improving the business 
environment, supporting SMEs and liberalising network industries (energy, telecommunication, 
transport). With respect to financial commitments, the focus appears to be on agriculture, 
infrastructure and education.  
Overall, the pace of structural reforms appears to be relatively moderate in the programme, which 
allocates a limited amount of budgetary resources to promote structural reforms. Furthermore, a 
considerable share of the available funds seems to be devoted to areas which in view of meeting the 
Copenhagen criteria might not be the most effective ones, such as agriculture, while improved funding 
for addressing education and labour market rigidities might have been more in line with accession 
related priorities.  With respect to the timing of reforms, the programme presents a back-loaded 
approach with respect to improving infrastructure, while the support for agriculture is more 
concentrated towards the immediate future. 
With respect to the reform of capital markets, the programme envisages a further alignment with the 
EU acquis and a further strengthening of the regulatory and supervisory institutions. In contrast to the 
product market reforms, the information provided in this respect is more concrete and operational. 
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2.5.2. Labour market  
The document contains information on recent labour market reforms and in particular on 
administrative measures, but however, the information on policy objectives for the remaining 
programme period in very limited.  
2.5.3. Other reform areas  
Concerning other reform areas, the most noteworthy additional reform projects are related to the 
judiciary system, health and education, public administration, including a reform of the financial 
system and the decentralisation of competences from the central government to the local 
administrations, IT, environment and regional development. Overall, the presentations tend to devote 
much emphasis on past developments and often remain relatively vague with respect to concrete plans 
for the programme period. Like in the other reform areas, the conceptual link to the EU accession 
process, notably the European Partnership, is rather limited. 
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Table II.2.6:
Annex: Structural indicators
EU 27
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General economic background
Real GDP 1 4.1 4.1 4.0 5.9 5.0 2.5 2.0 3.1 2.9 1.4
Labour productivity 2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Real unit labour cost 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.4 -0.6 -1.1 -0.8 -1.6
Real effective exchange rate 4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 101.2 107.5 106.4 107.9 114.0
Inflation rate 5 -0.4 0.5 3.2 2.3 8.3 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.3 3.7
Unemployment rate 6 37.2 37.3 36.0 34.9 33.5 9.0 8.9 8.2 7.1 7.0
Employment
Employment rate 7 33.8 34.1 35.2 36.2 37.3 63.0 63.6 64.5 65.4 n.a.
Employment rate - females 8 25.7 25.4 27.0 28.0 28.2 55.5 56.3 57.3 58.3 n.a.
Employment rate of older workers 9 21.9 23.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 40.7 42.3 43.5 44.7 n.a.
Long term unemployment 10 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.0 n.a.
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 44.4 42.2 43.3 43.3 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.0 9.8 10.7 10.7 n.a.
Net FDI  13 6.0 1.6 6.8 4.3 6.7 0.9 1.7 2.2 3.4 n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aid 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.6 0.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Business investment 16 10.9 3.0 4.0 n.a. n.a. 17.2 17.7 18.2 18.7 n.a.
Knowledge based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 3.7 4.0 4.3 n.a. n.a. 12.5 13.2 13.0 n.a. n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.1 5.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 77.1 77.5 77.9 78.1 n.a.
R&D expenditure 20 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 n.a.
Broadband penetration rate (EU25) 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.5 10.6 14.8 19.0 n.a.
Source:  Commission services, national sources
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.  2. Labour productivity per person employed - GDP in PPS per person employed relative to EU-25 (EU-
25=100).  3. Growth rate of the ratio: compensation per employee in current prices divided by GDP (in current prices) per total employment.  
4. Vs IC36 (1995 = 100), current year's values are based on Commission's forecast deflator figures, nominal unit labour cost deflator.  5. 
Annual average rate of change in Interim Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs), tFYRoM = CPI.  6. Unemployed persons as a 
share of the total active population.  7. Employed persons aged 15-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  8. Employed women 
aged 15-64 in % of total female population of the same age group.  9. Employed persons aged 55-64 (EU27) or 50-64 (tFYRoM)) in % of 
total population of the same age group.  10. Long-term unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active population aged 15-64.   11. 
comparative price levels of final consumption by private households including indirect taxes (EU-25=100).  12. Trade integration - Average 
value of imports and exports of goods divided by GDP.  
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value,
13. Average value of inward and outward FDIs flows in % of GDP.  14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total net generation). 15. 
In % of GDP. 16. Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Total tertiary graduates in science and technology per 
1000 of population aged 20-29.  18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP. 19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having 
completed at least upper secondary education.  20. GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP.  21. Percentage of 
households with broadband at home.
The former Yugoslav Republic
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3.1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Turkey submitted the eighth Pre-accession Economic Programme (PEP) in early April 2009, after the 
submission deadline set for January 31. The delay was caused by the need to adjust short and medium-
term macroeconomic and fiscal projections to the IMF programme under discussion. The PEP covers 
2009-2011 and has been prepared under the coordination of the Undersecretariat of State Planning 
Organization with contributions of relevant ministries and institutions. It has been adopted by the 
decision of the High Planning Council. 
The PEP presents a comprehensive and largely consistent macroeconomic and fiscal framework which 
is based on broadly realistic macroeconomic projections. The programme’s overarching objectives are 
to minimize negative effects of the global crisis on growth, to continue the disinflation policies, to 
create an environment conducive to economic growth through implementing fiscal and income 
policies in a way to contribute to macroeconomic stability. Priorities related to growth, employment 
and inflation were tentatively taken into consideration within the constraints of the global business 
cycle. The document largely complies with the content, form and data requirements and appears 
consistent with earlier key policy documents, including the 2008 National Programme, and the 2009 
budget. 
The PEP has been prepared in a challenging economic environment. The economic crisis originated in 
the financial markets of developed countries, started to impact Turkey more seriously as of mid-2008 
and brought about a sharp fall in economic activity, as well as major uncertainties. In the light of these 
developments, the PEP envisages that the Turkish economy will contract significantly, by 3.6%, in 
2009. The economy will begin to recover starting from 2010 growing by 3.3% and will converge to a 
level close to its potential growth – 4.5% – by 2011. These assumptions largely concur with the 
European Commission's spring 2009 forecast as regards 2009. However, reaching the growth rates 
projected for 2010 and 2011, may require a longer than envisaged adjustment process. The inflation 
outlook of the programme appears broadly reasonable, maybe even too conservative given the recent 
acceleration of the disinflation process. 
The tight fiscal policy implemented since the 2001 crisis based on yielding large primary surpluses in 
order to reduce the public debt stock is being relaxed in the context of the economic crisis, as the 
primary surplus targets are significantly reduced. The document does not describe in great detail how 
the new targets will be achieved as the fiscal policies are not always clear and adequately quantified.  
In addition, fiscal risks are significant given a rather optimistic projection of revenues for 2009-2010 
and the downside risks to growth, in particular for 2010-2011. The authorities have also initiated in 
April 2009 a consistent fiscal stimulus package (amounting to about €27 billion or about 5.1% of GDP 
over the programme period) in order to mitigate adverse effects of the crisis on growth and 
employment. While the fiscal response aims at being strongly countercyclical, the relaxation of 
current spending ahead of the 2009 local elections and the unbalanced composition of the anti-crisis 
weaken the quality of public spending and its overall impact on the country's growth potential. In 
2009, the fiscal relaxation to the tune of around 3% of GDP is largely accounted for by increased 
current transfers and interest payments. Therefore, a more appropriate fiscal response is deemed 
necessary in particular by restraining current spending and maintaining public investment at previous 
levels as a share of GDP in order to mitigate the effects of the crisis. In addition, the size of the fiscal 
response should carefully calibrated, in order to avoid a crowding-out of private investment and a 
deterioration of investor confidence also given the already high cost of debt roll-over. A strong and 
 binding fiscal rule, as spelled out in the PEP, may be very helpful in this respect, especially if 
introduced before 2011 since markets tend to penalise uncertainty. 
The basic objective of the monetary policy is to ensure price stability. The monetary policy will be 
implemented within the framework of explicit inflation targeting, as in the 2008 PEP period. The 
Central Bank will continue to use short term interest rates as the basic policy instrument. In the 
upcoming period, the Central Bank will focus on the medium-term inflation outlook and set the 
monetary policy decisions in line with this outlook, which may lead to further easing after base rates 
were cut by 750 basis points between November 2008 and May 2009. In addition, the floating 
exchange rate regime will also be maintained. Foreign exchange rates will be determined by supply 
and demand conditions in the market as in the previous years, and the Central Bank will not set any 
target for exchange rates. However, the Central Bank may directly intervene in the foreign exchange 
market via FX buying or FX selling interventions on its own initiative, in order to prevent actual and 
potential excess volatility in the foreign exchange rates, as it did in early 2009.  
A significant reduction of the current account deficit, as projected in the PEP, seems realistic. Exports 
are to be significantly affected by lower global demand, and imports are affected by the lower energy 
and commodity prices and depressed domestic demand. The PEP scenario is fairly conservative in 
projecting capital inflows and the stock of foreign reserves especially if the recent large and 
unrecorded capital inflows are taken into account. Despite large capital inflows to Turkey in recent 
years, it is indeed realistic to assume the occurrence of capital outflows over the program period, in 
particular of a net outflow in 2009, albeit not to the extent that financing is severely put at risk. In this 
regard, the authorities' adherence to prudent policies and measures to anchor the credibility of markets 
and investors are important. 
Structural reforms have been implemented with determination in previous years and will be continued 
in the 2009-2011 period. They aim at strengthening the market mechanisms, increase competitiveness, 
reduce the share of the public sector in the economy through privatization, strengthen the functions of 
regulatory and supervisory agencies, develop the intermediary capacity of the financial sector to meet 
funding requirements needs of the enterprise sector. Besides, the PEP stresses the importance of 
improving labour qualifications according to market demands and of  strengthening the link between 
the labour market and the education system. The programme also refers to the important role of  
improving the effectiveness of public services, eliminating the deficiencies in health and social 
security systems, increasing R&D activities and innovative capacity, improving transportation and 
energy infrastructure, ensuring regional development and increasing productivity in agriculture. 
Taking into account the ongoing negative developments in the world economy, the programme's 
objectives of sustaining the dynamics of structural reforms is commendable and the right approach for 
minimizing the impact of the crisis in the short and medium-term. However, recent global 
developments put the privatization scenario at risk and have already started creating larger imbalances 
in the labour market than foreseen in the PEP.  
3.2. INTRODUCTION 
 
Turkey submitted its eighth Pre-accession Economic Programme, following government adoption on 
4 April 2009, after the submission deadline set for January 31. The delay was caused by the need to 
adjust short and medium term macroeconomic and fiscal projections to the IMF programme under 
discussion. The programme covers the period 2009-2011 and represents an update of the previous 
years' submission. It builds on earlier policy documents, such as the "National Programme 2008", 
adopted in December 2008 and the "Medium Term Fiscal Framework and Medium Term Economic 
Programmes adopted in 2008.  The document broadly complies with the content, form and data 
requirements.  Comments and suggestions by the Commission made in its last years' PEP assessment 
have been taken on board and led to technical improvements. In particular, the information related to 
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 the ongoing crisis appears highly relevant and useful. The PEP is supported by a sufficiently 
comprehensive and broadly consistent macroeconomic framework. However, the fiscal and labour 
market scenarios appear rather optimistic in the current crisis context. The programme’s overarching 
objectives are: to minimize negative effects of the global crisis on growth, to continue the disinflation 
policies and to create an environment conducive to economic growth through implementing fiscal and 
income policies in a way to contribute to macroeconomic stability. Priorities related to inflation, 
growth and employment were tentatively taken into consideration within the constraints of the needs 
of the economy and the restrictions of the global business cycle, and adequately address most of the 
economic priorities of the Accession Partnership and the key challenges spelled out in the 2008 
Progress Report. 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Real GDP growth (% change) COM 4.7 1.1 -3.7 2.2 n. a.
PEP 4.7 1.1 -3.6 3.3 4.5
Consumer price inflation (% COM 8.4 10.4 7.3 6.3 n. a.
PEP 8.4 9.6 7.1 6.5 5.6
General government balance (% of GDP) (*) COM -0.2 -2.1 -4.6 -4.1 n. a.
PEP -0.2 -1.5 -4.6 -3.2 -2.8
Primary balance (% of GDP) (*) COM n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
PEP 5.7 4.1 1.7 2.6 2.6
Government gross debt (% of GDP) (*) COM 39.4 39.5 42.7 43.4 n. a.
PEP n. a. 39.5 43.1 44.1 43.4
Table II.3.1:
Comparison of key macroeconomic and budgetary projections
Source: PEP 2009, Commission autumn 2008 forecasts  
3.3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND CHALLENGES 
3.3.1. Recent macroeconomic developments 
Economic activity slowed down sharply since mid-2008, and GDP contracted significantly in the final 
quarter of the year.  Since the beginning of 2009, business and consumer confidence indicators started 
to improve, albeit from very poor levels. Nonetheless economic activity may have contracted at a 
double-digit rate in the first quarter of 2009, according to the central bank. Industrial output fell by 
over 20% in the year to April 2009, and exports shrunk in tandem by around 25%. In the period 
between November 2008 and May 2009, the central bank started a monetary easing cycle, whereby 
key rates were cut by a cumulative 750 bps to 9.25%. The local banking system appears relatively 
sound, but credit conditions became stricter and the ratio of non-performing loans slowly increased to 
rates above 4% by the end of the first quarter. In parallel with the decline in economic activity, the 
roll-over of external debt by the private sector receded, albeit not dramatically. The current account 
deficit is shrinking fast as a result of decelerating domestic demand and the favourable impact of oil 
and commodity prices, and is expected to narrow to 1-2% of GDP in 2009 from 5.7% of GDP in 2008. 
This reduces the external financing needs of the country and somewhat eases the pressure on the 
currency.  
The PEP provides a concise and up-to-date overview of recent macroeconomic developments at the 
time of submission.  It provides useful explanations for deviations of actual developments from 
estimates presented in the previous PEP.   
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 Box II.3.1: The global financial crisis: first impact and policy response.
The global financial crisis and economic slowdown in Turkey's main trading partners has
adversely affected the Turkish economy. Growth decelerated markedly and economic prospects have
become much bleaker. The large stock and important short-term debt repayment obligations, in particular
of the corporate sector, are key challenges against the background of much tighter external financing
conditions and increased market uncertainty. A comfortable stock of international reserves and private
sector foreign assets may serve as a cushion in the event of lower external financing. The financial sector
remained relatively stable still benefiting from the major restructuring and the improved regulation and
supervision implemented after the 2001 financial crisis. 
The Turkish authorities adopted a number of measures to mitigate potential shocks that may arise from
the financial crisis. In total, stimulus measures amount to about € 27 billion (TRL 54 billion) in 2008-
2010, or about 5.1% of GDP, of which about € 20 billion will be have a direct budgetary impact.  
Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy easing was initiated in November 2008, and the central bank cut base lending rates by a
cumulative 750 basis points by May. The central bank justifies the strong easing on the economic
slowdown and the decline in inflation, but spill-over effects on the exchange rate are likely. In addition,
the central bank took measures to increase FX liquidity on the inter-bank market and occasionally sold a
daily amount of USD 50 million in order to prevent excess volatility of the exchange rate.  
Fiscal policy measures 
The government has adopted several stimulus packages, including the provision of zero-interest loans for
SMEs, a tax break for local investors in equities, and inducements for Turks to repatriate savings held
offshore. A crisis package adopted in mid-March supports domestic demand by cutting taxes on the sale
of cars, office furniture, IT, houses and machinery used by SMEs for a period of three months. The
government intends to establish a Credit Guarantee Fund, in order to facilitate SME-lending.   
 
3.3.2. Key policy challenges 
 
The key policy challenge at this juncture appears to be the calibration of the fiscal response to the 
crisis both in terms of its size and composition. The authorities need to avoid a fiscal relaxation that 
would put at risk the macro-economic stability achieved so far or would weaken the long-term 
growth-potential of the economy. Coupled with productivity enhancing structural reforms this should 
play a key role in the narrowing of the country's savings-investment gap and in reducing the present 
heavy reliance on foreign savings. A continuation of a prudent monetary policy aimed at stabilising 
the exchange rate seems essential to anchor market expectations under more severe external financing 
constraints and to preserve financial sector stability. This policy mix needs to be supported by 
comprehensive structural reforms, particularly in areas which have a direct effect on the quality and 
sustainability of public finances. Notably, reforms should be directed at reigning in the significant 
increase in current spending envisaged for 2009. Progress in reforms has been somewhat slowing 
down in recent years and more determination seems necessary if the key objectives of the PEP were to 
be met in a difficult external environment. 
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 3.4. MEDIUM-TERM MACROECONOMIC SCENARIO 
The PEP 2009-2011 presents a comprehensive medium-term macroeconomic scenario with 
projections for key economic variables, covering real sector, employment, wage, inflation as well as 
external developments. The growth projections have been significantly revised downward from last 
year's PEP scenario, taking into account a much less favourable external environment. As a result the 
macroeconomic scenario appears as broadly realistic. However, the projections of real GDP growth in 
2010 and 2011 are surrounded by significant downside risks and employment assumptions over the 
programme period appear as overly optimistic. The PEP does not explicitly discuss alternative 
scenarios. In the present context the programme could usefully have presented a more detailed 
assessment of risks related to the financial crisis and the recession in the EU and its possible effects on 
the macroeconomic programme.  
The external assumptions of the PEP 2009-2011 have markedly changed in line with a considerably 
less benign external outlook, but downside risks appear to prevail. For 2009, the programme assumes 
euro area real growth rates of -4.1% and 0.2%, respectively. The volume of world imports is assumed 
to shrink by 13.2%. Oil prices in 2009 are projected at 50 US-$ per barrel. All of these assumptions 
appeared plausible at the time of submission.  
Real sector 
The PEP projects a further slowdown of real growth to -3.6% in 2009, down from an expected growth 
of 1.1% in 2008, before it accelerates to 3.3% in 2010 and to 4.5% in 2011 on the assumption of a 
gradual recovery of the world economy. The temporary output decline in 2009 is primarily the result 
of slowing domestic demand, in particular gross fixed capital formation, by over 13%. The private 
consumption growth is projected to decelerate to a negative 3.1%, while public consumption growth is 
expected to increase above 3% from 1.8% in 2008. Apart from strong base effects, this increase 
results from the announced fiscal stimulus, including some large infrastructure projects stimulus and 
the increase in current public spending which took place around the local elections in early 2009.  The 
large fall in domestic investment primarily stems from a significant reduction of corporate sector 
investments, tighter external financing conditions and weak business confidence. The growth of 
exports of goods and services is expected to fall in line with lower foreign demand from the main EU 
trading partners. The contribution of net exports to growth turned positive in 2008, and it is projected 
to remain broadly constant in 2009, as the volume of total imports will fall by around 15.5% 
compared with 11% for total exports. For 2010 and 2011, the PEP projects a strengthening of the 
economy, supported by an improved business climate and a continuation of productivity enhancing 
structural reforms. Growth rates of private consumption and of total investments are expected to 
resume to 4.3% and 8.5%, respectively, by 2011.  
Overall, the PEP's growth projections for 2009 appear realistic at the time of submission, given the 
marked deterioration of the external environment, including a projected growth slowdown in Turkey's 
major EU trading partners. Moreover, external financing constraints are likely to limit the scope for 
corporate sector investment and the reduction in total investments could actually be stronger than 
projected by the PEP. However, the increase in private consumption growth could be much more 
subdued in 2010, resulting from lower employment and disposable incomes, negative wealth effects 
from asset price adjustments, tighter borrowing conditions and weak consumer confidence in a 
situation of high uncertainty. It seems that those effects may have been underestimated in the 
programme. The assumption of a growth recovery in 2010 and 2011 therefore appears optimistic. 
Reaching growth rates close to potential growth may require a longer than envisaged adjustment 
period.  
 
On labour market developments, the PEP projects employment growth to fall to 1% in 2009, from 
1.8% in 2008, and to slightly accelerate again to 1.5% by 2011. The unemployment rate (ILO) will 
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 continue to rise, to 13.9% at the end of the PEP horizon. It appears unrealistic that the slowdown in 
growth in 2008 and 2009 does not have stronger effects on employment and unemployment levels, in 
particular in view of the developments in the first four months of 2009. Overall, the programme may 
underestimate the negative effects of a rapidly slowing economy on labour market dynamics.   
 
COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP COM PEP
Real GDP (% change) 4.7 4.7 1.1 1.1 -3.7 -3.6 2.2 3.3 n. a. 4.5
Contributions:
- Final domestic demand 5.2 5.2 -0.7 -0.8 -5.3 -5.0 2.2 3.6 n. a. 5.1
- Change in inventories 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3 -1.3 -0.2 0.6 0.0 n. a. 0.3
- External balance of 
goods and services -0.3 -0.3 1.6 1.6 2.9 1.6 -0.7 -0.3 n. a. -0.9
Employment (% change) 1.1 1.1 1.8 1.5 -2.8 -1.8 0.8 1.0 n. a. 1.5
Unemployment rate (%) 9.9 9.9 9.4 10.6 13.1 13.5 12.9 13.9 n. a. 13.9
GDP deflator (% change) 6.2 6.2 11.4 11.5 4.5 5.5 5.5 5.0 n. a. 4.5
CPI inflation (%) 8.4 8.4 10.4 9.6 7.3 7.1 6.3 6.5 n. a. 5.6
Current account balance 
(% of GDP) -5.9 -5.9 -5.7 -5.7 -1.8 -1.9 -2.8 -3.0 n. a. -4.0
Table II.3.2:
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Comparison of macroeconomic developments and forecasts
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP); Commission services Spring 2009 forecasts (COM)  
Inflation 
As a result of higher commodity and energy prices as well as still relatively strong domestic demand, 
end-of period inflation increased in 2008 to 9.6% from 8.4% in 2007. The PEP projects a reduction in 
inflation to 7.1% in 2009, 6.5% in 2010, and a further gradual adjustment to 5.6% at the end of the 
PEP period. However, inflation has come down more rapidly than anticipated in the first four months 
of the year to 6.1%, primarily due to large falls in energy and food prices. The projection is based on a 
stable exchange rate of the TRL in real effective terms against the euro, lower food and energy prices 
on world markets and a marked deceleration of domestic demand. The PEP assumes that cost push 
pressures will remain limited as the growth of unit labour costs will be subdued.  
The inflation outlook of the programme appears conservative and it is very likely that inflation will 
undershoot the Central Bank target in 2009. However, a number of risks stem from both to foreign 
and domestic factors. Higher prices for imported raw materials are likely to translate into higher 
inflation. Domestically, stronger inflationary pressures could result from stronger wage increases, if 
public sector pay increases cannot be contained and spill over to the private sector. Moreover, 
necessary alignments of indirect taxes (e.g. excises) as well as further adjustments of administrative 
prices could add to prices increases. At the same time it is reasonable to assume that a continuation of 
the stability-oriented monetary policy framework will help preventing a significant re-acceleration of 
inflation in the medium-term.  
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
The present policy framework, which has been in place for several years, is labelled as an inflation 
targeting floating exchange rate regime. The primary policy objective is price stability, and the 
exchange rate has recently successfully been used as a stabilisation devise, conducive to anchoring 
inflationary expectations. The PEP rightly argues that the choice for such a regime is largely 
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 determined by the fact that the structural transformation in the Turkish economy, the convergence 
process and the pricing behaviour inherited from the high inflation period warrant a gradual path 
towards price stability. As the main policy instrument, short-term rates will be primarily determined 
by considering the medium-term inflation outlook as before. Furthermore, the Central Bank may use 
instruments such as required reserve ratios or effective liquidity management if necessary. Turkey is a 
relatively open economy where the euro is widely used for trade invoicing and the dollar still prevails 
in debt holding. The latter could imply significant risks due to balance sheets mismatches of the 
private corporate and non-corporate sector. Under these conditions, the avoidance of too high 
volatility becomes an objective in itself to safeguard financial sector and macroeconomic stability. 
The central bank stands ready to take additional measures aimed at improving the foreign exchange 
liquidity in the banking system with a view to mitigating the effects of the global financial crisis (see 
Box 1 for previous actions to improve the management of FX liquidity).  
External sector 
The PEP projects a marked reduction of the current account deficit in 2009, to 1.9% of GDP in 2009 
from 5.7% in 2008, followed by a widening to 4.0% of GDP by 2011. These assumptions appear 
plausible. Although the growth of exports will be significantly affected by lower demand of Turkey's 
main trading partners, reduced total imports are likely to have a much larger impact on the current 
account, due to the combined effect of lower prices for energy and commodities and a significant 
deceleration of domestic consumption and investment.  Moreover, a reduction of the current account 
deficit appears also plausible, given the external financing constraints. On the financing side, the PEP 
remains relatively optimistic on the continuation of FDI flows. Overall, the PEP scenario is fairly 
conservative in projecting capital inflows and the stock of foreign reserves especially if the recent 
large and positive unrecorded capital inflows are taken into account. Despite large capital inflows to 
Turkey in recent years, it is indeed realistic to assume increased volatility of capital flows over the 
program period, in particular in 2009, albeit not to the extent that financing would be severely put at 
risk. 
Main risks 
The main risks to the macroeconomic framework are clearly associated with more pronounced 
adverse effects of the global crisis on Turkey's real economy and financial sector. A longer lasting 
downturn in the major EU trading partners would certainly affect prospects for a resumption of 
growth as early as projected by the PEP. Risks are somewhat elevated due to significant external 
vulnerabilities emanating from the high level of external financing needs and large debt service 
obligations coming due in the coming years, particularly in the corporate sector. The programme 
benefits from in-depth assessment of those issues, whereby it concludes that Turkey’s non-banking 
sector holds a substantial open foreign exchange position, and is therefore sensitive to external shocks, 
particularly exchange rate fluctuations. However, the concentration of these FX liabilities in large-
scale and/or exporting firms with relatively sound balance sheets reduces default risk. Moreover, the 
fact that about one-third of non-bank firms’ external debt has been borrowed from foreign branches of 
domestic commercial banks also needs to be considered. Since further declines in domestic and 
foreign demand are expected in 2009, together with some further tightening in credit conditions, the 
FX liabilities of the non-banking sector need to be closely monitored to preserve macroeconomic 
stability. 
3.5. PUBLIC FINANCE 
 
The fiscal framework of the PEP 2009-2011 is presented as an integral part of - and supportive to - the 
overall medium-term economic policy framework, which aims at maintaining debt levels close to 40% 
of GDP, enabling sustainable growth, reducing unemployment and increasing employment levels. The 
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 general direction of continued fiscal adjustment to ensure long-term sustainability of public finances 
remains unchanged and broadly appropriate in view of higher public spending and significant external 
vulnerabilities. However, fiscal targets are less ambitious compared to last year's PEP. The sizeable 
fiscal relaxation envisaged in 2009 in the context of the economic crisis and prior to the March local 
elections, combined with the suggested approach of adopting a strong fiscal rule by only 2011 may 
not sufficiently reflect the much tighter external financing constraints both for the public and the 
private sectors. Moreover, there are serious risks that the actual fiscal outcome could be even less 
favourable than projected in the programme, as the revenue projections for 2009 and 2010 appear as 
overly optimistic given the strong decline of indirect taxes and the temporary tax cuts adopted by the 
government. The programme contains limited information on key fiscal measures and their respective 
quantitative effects. An assessment on the cyclical position of the economy and the cyclically adjusted 
profile of fiscal policy is provided, but the programme would have benefited from a more in-depth 
assessment of automatic stabilisers in the context of an economic slowdown.  The sensitivity analysis 
is welcome, but potential fiscal risks appear to be much more elevated than those presented in the 
previous programmes. The programme makes an attempt to apply ESA 95 standards and fiscal data 
are broadly consistent with those presented in the recent fiscal notification submitted in April 2009.  
Graph II.3.1: Budgetary developments
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The fiscal programme envisages a worsening of the consolidated general government balance, from an 
expected deficit of 1.5% of GDP in 2008 to a 4.6% deficit in 2009, before gradually improving to 
2.8% of GDP by 2011, largely in line with the growth scenario. The primary surplus will move in 
parallel, first falling from 4.1% of GDP in 2008 to 1.7% of GDP in 2009 and subsequently increase to 
2.6% of GDP in 2010-2011.  The public spending ratio increases by almost four percentage points of 
GDP in 2009, and falls  only marginally by 0.5% of GDP by 2011.  In particular, spending on social 
transfers increases significantly by almost 2 percentage points of GDP, together with interest 
payments and other current spending.  At the same time, the revenue-to-GDP ratio is planned to 
increase by about 1 percentage points over 2008 to 2011, which does not seem realistic in the present 
crisis context.  The general government debt ratio is projected to rise by around 4.5 percentage points 
in 2008-2010, from a projected 39.5% of GDP in 2008 to 44.1% of GDP in 2010, mainly driven by a 
worsening of the primary balance and a deceleration of the nominal GDP growth. In view of the above 
mentioned risks to fiscal revenue, and possible higher deficit outcomes, public debt may increase to 
substantially higher levels. 
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 Change:
2008-11
Revenues 33.6 32.8 33.6 34.2 33.9 1.1
- Taxes and social security contributions 30.1 30.1 30.5 31.2 31.0 0.9
    - Other (residual) 3.5 2.7 3.1 3.0 2.9 0.2
Expenditure 33.8 34.2 38.2 37.4 36.7 2.5
- Primary expenditure 27.9 28.6 32.0 31.6 31.3 2.7
Gross fixed capital formation 3.2 3.3 2.8 2.8 2.7 -0.6
Consumption 15.0 15.5 16.4 16.2 16.0 0.5
Transfers & subsidies 5.1 4.9 6.8 6.9 7.0 2.1
Other (residual) 4.6 4.9 6.0 5.7 5.6 0.7
- Interest payments 5.9 5.6 6.2 5.8 5.4 -0.2
Budget balance -0.2 -1.4 -4.6 -3.2 -2.8 -1.4
- Cyclically adjusted -2.0 -0.6 -1.0 0.0 -0.3 0.3
Primary balance 5.7 4.2 1.6 2.6 2.6 -1.6
Gross debt level na 39.5 43.1 44.1 43.4 3.9
Sources: Pre-Accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations
Table II.3.3:
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Composition of the budgetary adjustment  (% of GDP)
 
3.5.1. Budget implementation in 2008 
As for the year 2008, the original budget framework presented in last years' PEP (and adopted in late 
2007) foresaw a broadly balanced budget for the consolidated general government sector of 1.5% of 
GDP, as in 2007.  However, budget revenues performed particularly poorly, and fell by 0.8 percentage 
points of GDP from 2007, mainly due to a significant fall in indirect taxes. The PEP does not provide 
sufficient information on the budget execution in 2008, which is a major shortcoming. Data presented 
for 2008 show the broad picture, but fail to adequately link in a quantitative way the budget 
performance to the business cycle and/or policy related events. In this respect, some detail and 
estimates of the budgetary impact of the temporary subsidisation of the social security contributions 
by the Treasury would have been useful. 
3.5.2. Near-term and medium-term budget strategy  
For the year 2009 and in line with the budget framework adopted in late 2008, the programme projects 
an increase in spending of 4% of GDP in tandem with increasing revenues but at a slower pace. 
Accordingly, the general government deficit will increase by around 3.1 percentage points to 4.6% of 
GDP. The moderate increase in the share of revenue to GDP appears to be optimistic and inconsistent 
with the projected fall in GDP growth, assuming that the tax elasticity will not improve in the short-
term. The increase of the expenditure-to-GDP ratio in 2009 is largely driven by higher current 
transfers (up by 3.7 percentage points), which appears to be in part linked to the increasing social 
spending commitments and social security deficits. The increase in interest payments from 5.6% of 
GDP in 2008 to 6.2% of GDP in 2009 does not appear to be entirely consistent with current, more 
optimistic expectations as regards the pricing of Turkey's sovereign debt. Overall, the PEP's fiscal 
framework for 2009 may become outdated once the announced budget rebalance takes place and 
Turkey decides on a new Medium-Term Fiscal Framework for 2009-2014.   
In 2009, the general government deficit is projected to increase  to 4.6% of GDP, before declining 
gradually to 2.8% of GDP by 2011. A major part of the adjustment over these two years is planned to 
be realised through a reduction of current transfers, by almost 1 percentage point. Although 
appropriate, this appears rather ambitious and the programme itself does not elaborate in more detail 
on these spending adjustments over the latter part of the PEP period.   
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 Fiscal risks are clearly related to the downside risks to growth assumptions of the programme, in 
particular after 2009. A stronger cyclical downturn is likely to worsen the fiscal balance. Also, the 
revenue base is likely to shrink, especially for indirect taxes, as a result of the ongoing disinflation 
process. Altogether, a much stronger decline in fiscal revenues than projected in the PEP is likely to 
materialise. Additional risks may result from a slower than envisaged implementation of reforms 
which could delay the realisation of budget savings. This refers in particular to current spending 
commitments and social transfers. The authorities may also be confronted with continued spending 
pressures. Finally, the current unfolding of the financial crisis may lead to pressures to increase short-
term discretionary spending to counterbalance the negative effects on growth and employment, and to 
higher costs of servicing outstanding public debt. The resulting combined effect of markedly lower 
fiscal revenues and pressures for higher current spending would undermine the envisaged fiscal path. 
Therefore, an appropriate fiscal response under current circumstances would require both bold fiscal 
measures to reign in current spending and the introduction of a binding fiscal rule. The programme is 
rather mute as regards the content of the fiscal rule which would represent an important step in the 
fiscal area. 
3.5.3. - Structural balance 
The PEP 2009-2011 provides an overview on the cyclical position of the economy and the impact of 
fiscal policy, using the same methodology in estimating cyclically adjusted primary balances as in last 
year's submission. On this basis, estimated potential growth would still exceed real output in 2011, but 
the gap would be on a declining trend. As of 2008, the structural and actual primary budget balances 
started to differ from each other significantly and the actual budget surplus significantly receded. It is 
estimated that the primary budget surplus which was around 5%-5.5% of GDP up to 2008, will recede 
to 1.4% on average in 2009-2011. On this basis, the PEP concludes that fiscal policy has pro-cyclical 
effects in 2009-2011. Given the methodological weaknesses, the statements on the effects of fiscal 
policy certainly need to be taken with caution. 
Debt levels and development, analysis of below-the-line operations and stock-flow 
adjustments 
The PEP 2009-2011 projects a baseline scenario of a gradual increase of general government debt 
from 39.5% of GDP in 2008 to 44.1% of GDP in 2010, followed by a decrease to 43.4% in 2011.  
Projections on the decomposition of changes in the debt ratio appear sufficiently comprehensive and 
consistent with the macro-economic and fiscal assumptions.  The nominal GDP effect and the 
projected worsening of the primary balance in 2009 have a marked effect on the increase of the debt 
ratio. The public debt sensitivity analysis presented in the PEP shows that the public debt ratio could 
increase by about 10 percentage points by 2011 under a combined shock scenario, i.e. when growth 
falls by 2%, the TRL depreciates by 5% and real interest rates increase by 500 base points. The 
analysis undertaken in the PEP is useful and confirms the need for continued fiscal discipline in order 
to ensure public debt sustainability. However, the current uncertainties regarding growth prospects 
may justify some analysis on the sensitivity of public debt to a larger growth contraction in the next 
programmes, and to subsequently worse fiscal balance outcomes.  
 
The debt management strategy continues to be broadly appropriate as it tries to meet the financing 
requirements at a low cost while maintaining reasonable risk levels. Borrowing mainly in domestic 
currency, at fixed rates and at longer maturities remains the main objective of the Treasury, which is 
overall consistent with the lower availability of international financing since October 2008. At the 
same time, an overreliance on the domestic market in the context of significantly higher than planned 
roll-over debt ratios (as witnessed in the first months of 2009) may exert a negative crowding-out 
effect on the borrowing of the private sector. In this respect, an expansion of the program to tap 
international capital markets through sovereign bond issues would provide some relief on the 
domestic credit market. The contingent liabilities of the government have remained under control also 
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 in 2008, as the Treasury guaranteed stock of debt increased by about USD 800 million to USD 5.6 
billion at the end of the year. In 2009, also in response to the economic crisis and tighter financing, the 
government has extended the limit for Treasury guarantees to USD 4 billion, from USD 2 billion in 
2007. 
Budgetary implications of major structural reforms 
As required, the programme (in its Annex) presents some estimates of the fiscal impact of reforms 
envisaged over the PEP horizon, which is a useful complement.  A summary overview is presented in 
table 4 of this assessment.  It shows that structural reforms will have an important impact on the 
country's fiscal position.  The agricultural reform project is expected to be finalized in 2009 and may 
cost 0.5% of GDP in 2009. The labour market reform, if coming into effect with the currently 
specified parameters, is expected to impose an additional burden of about 0.2% of GDP on the budget 
in 2009-2011.  
3.5.4. Sensitivity analysis and comparison with previous programme 
Like in last year's PEP, various sensitivity analyses were presented.  One scenario examined the 
sensitivity of public finances to lower growth and higher interest rates.  According to calculations 
presented in the PEP, the debt situation appears to be sustainable.  The most critical scenario is that of 
an increase/decrease of real interest rates for TRL-denominated debt by 5 percentage points compared 
to the baseline scenario, whereby the gross debt level would rise/fall by 1.7 percentage points.  While 
the analysis concludes plausibly that the sensitivity of the debt stock has fallen, this argument could be 
strengthened by the inclusion of more critical scenarios, in particular in view of the size of the current 
contraction in growth observed worldwide.    
3.5.5. Quality of public finance and institutional features 
The PEP 2009-2011 refers in a very general way to recent and ongoing institutional changes and 
policies which are deemed to improve the quality of public finances over the medium term.  It 
emphasises improvements in budget management, revenue collection and expenditure control as well 
as the adoption of a new public procurement system in line with EU practice and a new legal 
framework for public-private partnerships. The programme foresees that, in order to reduce the need 
for ad-hoc measures to reach fiscal targets, efforts to widen the tax base, better capture the 
unregistered economy, and decrease the number of tax exemptions will be intensified. Turkey has 
accomplished a remarkable effort of fiscal consolidation but ensuring a high-quality fiscal adjustment 
will be a key challenge in the coming years.  Indeed, fiscal imbalances might emerge over the medium 
term, either as a result of past policy commitments, for example in education and access to the 
universal health insurance, or owing to a still pending reform agenda.  In addition, infrastructure 
investment may need to increase in less developed regions, given the persistence of regional 
disparities in Turkey.  
As public expenditures are already relatively high there is limited scope for Turkey to increase 
expenditure in order to meet pressing convergence challenges.  Expenditure will also be contained in 
order to make room for lower taxes in the long run while preserving a sound fiscal framework. Fiscal 
policy would thus need to focus on trade-offs in expenditure allocations, possibly by reducing 
spending in functional areas, where it appears to be oversized in comparison with other similar 
countries.  At the same time, reforms will be implemented with the aim of improving the efficiency of 
expenditure programmes in areas where expenditure pressures are being felt, such as health care, 
education, social protection.  Reforms focused on the modernization of civil service pay and 
employment system and the rationalization of the investment programme, will also help contain 
pressures on the wage bill as well as investment spending and thus contribute to better control public 
 
49 
 expenditure across functional areas.  Efficiency considerations are considered to be the main priority 
in public expenditure policies.  
Conversely, the Turkish authorities have embarked on an ambitious reform by establishing a revenue 
administration.  This reform intends to increase the efficiency of tax collection, by means of 
enhancing automation, training staff and improving all underpinning facilities.  In addition, tax laws 
and regulations will be amended in order to re-assess tax exemptions with the objective of 
simplification and rationalization of the tax system.  Public expenditures will be prioritized with 
respect to resource scarcity and their impact on potential growth in the context of economic and social 
benefits.  Public agencies and institutions will revise their resource allocations under the specified 
priorities considering the budgetary means.  In this context, some activities and projects of lower 
priority will be eliminated and the thereby created fiscal space will be allocated to expenditure 
priorities with assumed growth potential. 
The basic objective of the tax policies to be implemented is to contribute to supporting growth and 
employment in accordance with macroeconomic policies, reducing informality in the economy, and 
creating a tax system that is simpler, fairer and with wider base.   Fight against the informal economy 
has been stepped up in accordance with the strategy established thanks to the cooperation between all 
relevant public bodies. Works are underway to  establish a call center where incidents can be reported 
easily and on time. A risk analysis center was set-up under the Revenues Administration and risk 
analysis models are developed for the supervision and compliance analysis on the corporate tax, 
income tax and VAT payers, for the purpose of speeding up and improving the fight against informal 
economy. Furthermore, labeling practice was started for the tobacco and alcohol market through the 
product tracking systemso as improve the tracking and supervision of the sector. At sectoral level, 
analysis works were conducted on risky tax-payer groups in order to research, analyze and report the 
tax deficit. Risk project work to determine and reduce informal economic activity will be elaborated 
upon.  
3.5.6. Sustainability of public finance 
Like in the previous years, the 2009 PEP does not contain a separate section on the long-term 
sustainability of public finances.  It would greatly benefit from some demographic and 
macroeconomic scenarios.  Turkey’s situation differs dramatically from that of EU Member States.  
With its very young population (the average age is just 28), falling birth rates, and significant in- and 
outward migration, some more in-depth analysis would be crucial in the context of a PEP, in particular 
since the Turkish authorities are moving to new health and pension systems, whereby key indicators, 
like for example retirement age, dependency ratio and overall labour market participation might be 
subject to significant changes. 
Indeed, even in case of a full implementation of the reform proposals, Turkey is not so well placed to 
meet the costs of an ageing population.  The introduction of a new and responsible social security 
system, and more generally, the future costs of the pension and health-care systems should therefore 
be monitored constantly and very carefully. 
 
The PEP 2009-2011 contains a short analysis of the long-term sustainability of public finances with a 
focus on pension, health and interest expenditure. Assumptions on long-term population trends as well 
as on participation rates have not been changed compared to last year's PEP. Differences to last year's 
scenario result primarily from the significantly lower growth rates due to the ongoing crisis, which 
may call for additional measures. The obvious challenges arising from demographic pressures remain 
significant, also in view of an already relatively high public debt ratio and a very low participation 
rate. Moreover, long-term sustainability could be further eroded, if growth and productivity trends 
turned out to be less comfortable and if participation rates fell below levels assumed under the 
programme. Given the risks and magnitude of challenges, the programme would have benefited from 
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 outlining a somewhat more thorough policy response to the challenges of an ageing society, beyond 
the ongoing social security reform.  
3.6. STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
The PEP 2009-2011 covers a broad range of structural reforms related to the enterprise and financial 
sector, labour market, agricultural sector, public administration, education, health care, judiciary, and 
environment.  The presentation is often backward looking, providing information on past and ongoing 
reform initiatives with a strong emphasis on harmonisation with EU requirements. More emphasis has 
been given to measures aimed at fighting the informal economy and improving the business 
environment, given the pertaining administrative obstacles still in place. The programme contains 
fiscal impact estimates on some measures, but the link between the structural reform agenda and the 
implementation of the fiscal strategy could be further strengthened. The full implementation of the 
structural reform agenda would in some cases require the establishment of time bound action plans 
and the definition of concrete measures and clear targets. The general aim of the PEP's structural 
reform agenda is to increase the efficiency in the private sector and the public administration and to 
support the strengthening of market forces. It is a mere update from the plans put in place over the last 
years, and covers various issues. The outlined reforms are at different stages in their implementation.  
The programme is quite clear on results and delays compared with what was outlined in the 2007 PEP. 
In some areas, however, e.g. competition policy and the investment climate, the programme would 
have benefitted from a better clarification of the targeted results and of the speed of operation.  In the 
area of privatisation, the government has modified its plans after the submission of the PEP, thereby 
delaying some key privatisations.  The budgetary effects of reforms to be implemented are outlined 
for all major reform areas, although cost estimates beyond 2008 are often lacking.  Overall, the 
structural reform agenda should be broadly supportive of further enhancement of Turkey's capacity to 
cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the EU.  More emphasis should be put on 
labour market reforms in order to support job creation and re-allocation during the economic 
transformation process.  As in previous years, the PEP also lacks clear policies and descriptions 
concerning research and development and innovation, an area which would be important to support a 
transformation to a knowledge-based economy, as laid out in the Lisbon agenda. On such a basis, it 
would be conducive to meeting the objectives of the Lisbon agenda concerning product, labour and 
capital markets and the establishment of a knowledge based economy. Intensified efforts to speed up 
the implementation of reforms, in particular in the areas of enterprise restructuring and privatisation, 
liberalisation of the energy market, education and labour markets flexibility would be supportive to 
the fulfilment of the second Copenhagen economic criteria over the medium term.    
Description of the Policy 2008 2009 2010 2011
1. Labour market -696.8 -791.7 -897.0 -950.0
2. Agriculture -1,953.9 -1,818.0 -11.5 0.0
3. Regional Development -29.2 -66.1 -58.7 -54.9
4. Health and social security 33.6 75.5 100.0 100.0
5. Transportation -2.1 -2.2 -0.4 -143.0
6. Energy 0.0 - - -
Total impact on the budget -2,648.4 -2,602.5 -867.6 -1,047.9
Table II.3.4:
Net direct budgetary impact of key reform commitments (EUR million)
Total impact on the budget (in % of GDP) -0.7 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2
Source: Pre-accession Economic Programme (PEP), ECFIN calculations  
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 3.6.1. Product and capital markets 
 
chemical industry. 
                                                          
The PEP 2009-2011 touches upon the following main reform areas related to the functioning of 
product markets: strengthening of competition policy and state aid control, privatisation, enterprise 
restructuring (railway sector, shipbuilding) and SME development. Further progress has been 
achieved in the area of competition policy and state aid control. The PEP envisages a continuation of 
measures aimed at a strengthening of the legal and institutional framework and a further 
harmonisation with EU requirements, which is welcome. The PEP rightly highlights the successful 
continuation of the privatisation process during 2007.  Privatisation revenues amounted to USD 7.5 
billion1 in the year up to November 2007. Such strong continuation of privatisation inflows 
constitutes a real achievement and is in stark contrast to the low levels attained in earlier years.  
However, despite strong inflows, delays have been encountered in certain sectors compared to what 
was envisaged in the 2006 PEP.  For several companies the sales procedures have taken longer than 
expected. The PEP outlines important sectors and companies for which privatisation efforts are 
envisaged to continue during the programme period.  These are, for example, banks, games of chance, 
ports and activities related to the sugar and petro
There is a risk that further delays will occur during the programme period compared to the outlined 
plans.  After two years of relatively intensive privatisation, the remaining portfolio of state-owned 
enterprises is likely to be more challenging to privatise: it is concentrated in areas where privatisation 
can be seen as more sensitive.  This seems to be for example the case for the energy sector, where 
tenders were launched in early 2009 for the privatisation of electricity distribution companies through 
transfer of operation rights. In addition, efforts are being made to privatise power distribution and 
generation simultaneously, which may be complicated by the fact that the sector is characterised by 
cross-subsidisation and that the privatisation of the distribution network may suffer from low 
profitability caused by imperfections in the pricing policy. 
Concerning the area of competition law and policies, no progress since the 2007 PEP has been 
achieved in putting in place a consistent monitoring of state aids.  The lack of regulation and 
monitoring of state aids continue to affect transparency and the overall competitive environment 
negatively.  Further steps have been taken to improve the business environment.  One positive 
development is the facilitation and simplification of the licensing process. A well-established policy 
framework, including for example, via the Investment Advisory Council, continues to support the 
reform process and to identify the problematic issues for investors. However, the PEP contains very 
limited information on issues that will be addressed over the programme period.  
In the field of banking, the harmonisation with EU and Basel II regulatory frameworks has not been 
advanced as planned.  A 25% share of the Halkbank's capital has been sold to private investors in 
February 2007. However, a concrete times schedule for the privatisation of the largest state bank, 
Ziraat Bank, has been delayed. But overall, the past and planned measures are supportive of the 
overall positive developments in the sector.  Despite the demonstrated improved resilience of the 
Turkish banking sector to severe market fluctuations, a continued strengthening of supervision will be 
important to further decrease risks in particular in the context of the still rapidly growing banking 
operations.  Concerning capital markets, several legal acts were put into effect in order to protect 
investors in capital markets and create a more stable and efficient market in line with the EU acquis. 
The programme gives a thorough overview of recent and planned measures aimed to align the 
financial sector legislation and in particular prudential regulations with EU requirements. This process 
appears to be well on track. Moreover, the banking sector has become more resilient as a result of a 
number of specific supervisory measures that have been taken to address potential macro-financial 
vulnerabilities. Additional capital requirements were imposed on fast-growing banks, and risk weights 
1  This currency denomination is the choice of the programme itself. 
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 on un-hedged foreign currency loans were increased. Banks' capital adequacy, asset quality and 
profitability have remained at comfortable levels. One would have expected the programme to discuss 
in more detail the new challenges for domestic financial and capital markets in the context of the 
global financial crisis and the possible policy responses to mitigate risks for financial sector stability.  
3.6.2. Labour market 
Like in previous years, the programme underlines the main problems and challenges in the Turkish 
labour market, such as the very low participation rates, the contraction of employment in the 
agricultural sector and the growing young population.  It also shows that there has been no significant 
improvement in unemployment or participation rates since the last PEP.  The programme strongly 
emphasises the link between the labour market and the education sector and the need to reduce the 
skills mismatch between labour demand and supply.  The overall educational attainment levels of the 
labour force are still low, despite improvements during the past decade.  Since the submission of the 
last PEP, some measures have been taken, for example to allow graduates from vocational high 
schools to switch to specific baccalaureate programmes more smoothly and to increase the availability 
of higher education.  Looking forward over the programme period, the PEP is quite vague on concrete 
measures that will be taken to further improve educational standards, apart from continuing the 
Privatization and Social Support Project and the Basic Education Programme. There is insufficient 
information about the planned scope for active labour market policies or the resources which will be 
put aside for this purpose.  
Non-wage labour costs remain high and the regulations of the labour market rigid, protecting workers 
rather than jobs.  Tackling these issues in a more systematic way would be supportive of addressing 
the identified challenges in the labour market, reduce informality, and support the creation of jobs in 
the challenging transformation period ahead.  The programme proposes to reduce the cost of 
employment by introduction of some measures, but these seem rather minor and the timing is not 
clear. 
3.6.3. Other reform areas 
The PEP outlines a wide range of areas where reform efforts have been ongoing and are foreseen to 
continue over the programme period.  Further efforts have been made to improve efficiencies in the 
agricultural sector, the public administration, the health and social security system, transportation, and 
some other smaller areas, which are yielding positive results, e.g. for the budgeting process and 
transparency.  However, the information provided in the PEP appears in many cases rather piecemeal 
and often further steps to be taken in these areas remain vague.  Local governments' reform is 
important in order to strengthen their role and abilities to perform the needed services.  Legal reforms 
have proceeded, but the PEP acknowledges that there are deficiencies in the capacity to implement 
laws at the local level.  
A large number of efforts have been ongoing aiming to raise the efficiency and production standards 
in the agricultural sector.  For example, further reforms took place concerning agricultural support 
policies and support for rural development investments.  Work continued within the project to prepare 
for the implementation of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy.  The agricultural sector remains 
relatively inefficient and highly labour intensive, implying a large scope for reforms yielding 
improvements.  The significant reduction in agricultural employment over the past year highlights that 
the transformation process is continuing, partly supported by policies but also driven by market forces.  
The PEP outlines the budgetary effects of a number of planned reforms in the agricultural sector.  
Several projects are estimated to carry relatively large positive net effects on the budget, thereby 
limiting the overall net costs for agricultural reforms, but it is unclear from the programme how these 
funds will be generated.  
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Table II.3.5:
Annex: Structural indicators
TURKEY EU 27
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
General economic background
Real GDP 1 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.5 1.1 2.5 2.0 3.1 2.9 1.4
Labour productivity 2 53.9 58.0 61.8 64.0 63.7 100 100 100 100 100
Real unit labour cost 3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -1.4 -0.6 -1.1 -0.8 -1.6
Real effective exchange rate 4 108.1 113.8 123.2 120.6 130.3 101.2 107.5 106.4 107.9 114.0
Inflation rate 5 10.1 8.1 9.3 8.8 10.4 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.3 3.7
Unemployment rate 6 10.3 10.2 8.4 8.5 n.a. 9.0 8.9 8.2 7.1 7.0
Employment
Employment rate 7 46.1 46.0 45.9 45.8 n.a. 63.0 63.6 64.5 65.4 n.a.
Employment rate - females 8 24.3 23.8 23.9 23.8 n.a. 55.5 56.3 57.3 58.3 n.a.
Employment rate of older workers 9 33.2 31.0 30.1 29.5 n.a. 40.7 42.3 43.5 44.7 n.a.
Long-term unemployment 10 3.5 3.5 2.5 2.2 n.a. 4.2 4.1 3.7 3.0 n.a.
Product market reforms 
Relative price levels 11 59.1 66.7 66.3 71.5 n.a. 100 100 100 100 100
Total trade-to-GDP ratio 12 20.2 19.8 21.6 21.1 n.a. 9.0 9.8 10.7 10.7 n.a.
Net FDI 13 0.5 1.2 2.0 3.1 n.a. 0.9 1.7 2.2 3.4 n.a.
Market share electricity 14 39.0 38.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Sectoral and ad-hoc state aid 15 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.6 0.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Business investment 16 28.4 17.4 13.3 5.5 n.a. 17.2 17.7 18.2 18.7 n.a.
Knowledge-based economy
Tertiary graduates 17 5.6 5.7 6.2 n.a. n.a. 12.5 13.2 13.0 n.a. n.a.
Spending on human resources 18 4.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.1 5.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Educational attainment 19 42.0 44.0 44.7 46.4 n.a. 77.1 77.5 77.9 78.1 n.a.
R&D expenditure 20 0.5 0.6 0.6 n.a. n.a. 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 n.a.
Broadband penetration rate (EU25) 21 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.5 10.6 14.8 19.0 n.a.
1. Growth rate of real GDP in %.   2. Labour productivity per person employed - GDP in PPS per person employed relative to EU-25 (EU-
25=100).   3. Ratio of compensation per employee to nominal GDP per person employed, total economy, annual percentage change.  4. Vs 
IC36 (1995 = 100), current year's values are based on Commission's forecast deflator figures, nominal unit labour cost deflator.  5. Annual 
average rate of change in Interim Harmonized Indices of Consumer Prices (HICPs).   6. Unemployed persons as a share of the total active 
population.  7. Employed persons aged 15-64 in % of total population of the same age group.   8. Employed women aged 15-64 in % of total 
female population of the same age group.   9. Employed persons aged 55-64 in % of total population of the same age group.  10. Long-term 
unemployed (over 12 months) in % of total active population aged 15-64.   11. Comparative price levels of final consumption by private 
households including indirect taxes (EU-25=100). 12. Trade integration - Average value of imports and exports of goods divided by GDP.  
13. In % of GDP, EU-25 = Average value 
of inward and outward FDIs flows in % of GDP.  14. Market share of the largest generator (% of total net generation).   15. In % of GDP.  16. 
Gross fixed capital formation by the private sector in % of GDP.  17.Tertiary graduates in science and technology per 1000 of population aged 
20-29.   18. Public expenditure on education in % of GDP.  19. Percentage of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper 
secondary education.  20. GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on R&D) - in % of GDP.           21. Percentage of households who have 
Broadband access at home.
Source:  Commission services.
f: forecast, e: estimated value, p: provisional value, b: break in series, s: Eurostat estimate, r: revised value, q: estimated from quarterly values.
 
